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This history examines attitudes toward and responses to school desegregation within an 
established, closely knit network of African-American communities in Prince George's 
County, Maryland, from 1954, immediately after Brown v. Board of Education, through 
the first year of the destabilizing busing era. Optimistic about the opportunities and social 
equality desegregated schooling might afford their children, black residents of this county 
nonetheless recognized the value of segregated schooling in securing a general sense of 
well being within both their children and their communities. Thus, for two decades they 
approached school desegregation with expectation and ambivalence, asserting collective 
agency to influence the school board's decision making, prevent the closing of black 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 In June 1992, journalist David Dent touted Prince George’s County, 
Maryland, as “the closest thing to utopia that black middle-class families could find in 
America.” The planners of a 1980s economic development strategy that aimed at 
selling homes in a new development to buyers with income in the “mid- to high-level 
executive” range did not anticipate the majority of the buyers would be black families 
with the income to afford such residences, but they were. While a white county 
resident and real estate agent told Dent she viewed this trend in new-home ownership 
as an “opportunity to show the rest of the country that integration can work,” a black 
homeowner scoffed at “this notion that we are aiming toward an integrated county.”1  
 The black homeowner's frank sentiment might have surprised residents who 
had lived in Prince George’s two decades earlier, when desegregating the county's 
public schools was the dominant topic among families, policy makers, educators, and 
others throughout the expansive region just outside the Nation's Capital.  
 Two years after this article was published, Wayne K. Curry, a black real estate 
attorney, millionaire, and graduate of the county school system, was elected county 
executive, the first black person to hold the office. Curry's first formal encounter with 
local government had come in the summer of 1959, when he was nine years old. 
Several black families in the segregated Ward 4 section of the town of Cheverly, 
where he lived, had asked the county board of education for permission to transfer 
their children to the whites-only Cheverly-Tuxedo Elementary School, which was 
                                                




nearer their homes, rather than have the children continue to walk outside their 
neighborhood to the school designated for black children.  
 One of the parents seeking the board's permission was Eugene "Bull" Curry, 
Wayne's father. The Currys' Ward 4 home was only a few blocks from the all-black 
Fairmont Heights High School, where Bull Curry taught shop. His employment with 
the school system carried no sway, however. The board of education denied the 
parents' transfer requests. Bull Curry threatened to sue the county, at the risk of being 
fired. Before school opened in September though, the board had relented, granting the 
transfers.2   
For the remainder of his school years, through elementary, junior high, and 
high school, Wayne Curry would attend school with the new classmates he met when 
he was nine, the majority of whom were white. When his peers in Ward 4 and several 
other black neighborhoods nearby were enrolling at Fairmont Heights High,3 Curry 
was enrolling in the predominantly white Bladensburg High. His senior year, 1967-
                                                
2. Leila P. Price and Fred Price, Jr., "A History of Old Ward Four, Town of Cheverly, 
Md." Cheverly History, Last modified March 10, 2017. 
https://sites.google.com/site/cheverlyhistory/Home/histories-of-cheverly/a-history-of-
the-old-fourth-ward, accessed October 16, 2016. 
 
3. The spelling of the high school, "Fairmont" instead of "Fairmount," as the town is 
spelled, is attributed to a desire to maintain consistency with the spelling of Fairmont 
Heights Elementary School. An incorrect signage order during construction of the 
elementary school in 1924 led to the naming inconsistency.  
"Fairmont Heights High School," Maryland Historical Trust, Maryland Inventory of 






68, Curry was one of 240 black students among the 2,200 students enrolled. He was 
senior class vice-president, and the president, his best friend, was white.4 
  
 This thesis explores what school desegregation meant to black students, 
parents, teachers, and communities in Prince George's County, Maryland, over the 
twenty years following the 1954 U. S. Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education. The scale, scope, and weight of the Brown decision compels a close look 
at how people whose ancestry in the region preceded the county's establishment in 
1696 interpreted desegregation as a social concept, as well as how they engaged with 
the process of desegregating their schools.  
 A number of scholarly works discuss the history and development of African-
American life in Prince George's County, including captive importation in the mid-
1600s; thriving enslaved and free within the western-shore, tobacco-driven economy; 
emancipation, community building, and schooling; suburbanization and 
politicization; employment and enterprise; and the attainment of personal wealth in 
the late twentieth century. Yet, there is no scholarly literature that reveals how local 
and federal policies two decades before court intervention in 1972 shaped this black 
community's attitudes about desegregation, determined their actions on behalf of their 
children, schools, and neighborhoods; and influenced the social conditions of the 
larger community in the years that followed.  
                                                
 
4. "Notes – Meeting, Supt. Schmidt and HEW" (July 25, 1968), Box 7, Folder 1, Ruth 




 The Prince George's County, Maryland, school district was among the ten 
largest school districts in the nation in the early 1970s. Along with two other large 
East Coast school systems -- Charlotte-Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, and 
Boston, Massachusetts – Prince George's County drew persistent and conspicuous 
media coverage for the federal-court orders regarding the desegregation of its public 
schools and for citizens' reactions to those orders. These court decisions compelled 
the districts to transport children to schools in communities that were geographically, 
racially, and ideologically apart and different from the communities where they lived. 
Throughout the 1970s, school desegregation was a crucial civil rights battle in "an 
undefeated but unfinished revolution," historian Jacquelyn Dowd Hall argues. Its 
outcomes could have more critical and lasting effects on American society than the 
protection of voting rights.5  
 Yet, while scholars have examined efforts to desegregate schools in Charlotte 
and Boston before court-ordered busing in the 1970s, none has critically examined 
the history of school desegregation in Prince George's County prior to 1972. In 
particular, there are no in-depth, scholarly studies of African-American community 
engagement with school desegregation policies, processes, and outcomes during the 
eighteen years between the Brown v. Board of Education decision and court-ordered 
busing in 1972.6 Nor is there a scholarly account of how blacks in Prince George's 
                                                
5. Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movement," Journal of American 
History 91, no. 4 (March 2005): 1263. 
 
6. Herbert H. Denton, "NAACP Sues County, Asks More Integration," Washington 





County interpreted the Brown ruling and the notion of desegregation, nor of black 
residents' interactions with the county school board during this period. This thesis 
finally does that work. 
 Adding to the existing analyses of how desegregated classrooms impacted 
black-student achievement, residential patterns, racial relations, and black political 
and economic empowerment, my research strives to contextualize these analyses by 
presenting personal perspectives on how black people interpreted and engaged with 
the process of desegregating their local schools. Focusing on several black 
communities that were north of the county's central corridor and spread out within ten 
miles of each other, I examine correspondence produced by citizens, the board of 
education, school system employees, and government officials, as well as newspaper 
reports and oral histories. I argue in this thesis that these communities were 
consistently involved with the process of desegregating public schools two decades 
before court-ordered busing went into effect in January 1973.7 Moreover, I contend 
that Prince George's black citizens met desegregation with not only optimism and 
determination, but also with trepidation. Recognizing Thurgood Marshall's color-
blind impetus in arguing Brown v. Board of Education, as well as his commitment to 
racial equality, many also recognized the capacity of desegregation to undermine their 
racial and cultural identity. Black Prince George's residents assertively resisted that 
effect. They advocated for the educational interests of their children and affirmed 
                                                
7. The communities studied in this thesis do not comprise the sum of black 
communities in Prince George's County during school desegregation; however, in 
many ways they are representative of those communities. Further, some students who 





pride in their communities, their schools, and their race until the mid-1970s. At that 
point, attainment of personal wealth among a segment of the black population 
produced visible class divisions and conflicting priorities, thus diluting efforts toward 
ensuring accountability to black children and communities in their pursuit of quality 
education.  
 This examination of these black communities' experiences during the era of 
school desegregation is grounded in the theories of sociologist Walter Allen, who 
argues:  
"The special circumstances that characterize Black family life in the 
United States, both historically and today, warrant – indeed require – that 
these families be examined in relation to their environments. Where this 
is done, one can expect clearer understandings of Black family 
experiences. African American families display an incredible diversity of 
value orientations, goals, behavioral patterns, structural arrangements, 
geographic locations, and socioeconomic statuses. [However,] this is not 
to ignore the elements which are common to all African American 
families – those qualities that join them and distinguish them from other 
families in the society.8  
  
 Sociologist Mary Pattillo-McCoy presents such an examination in Black 
Picket Fences, exploring the social conditions of an overlooked, post-World War II 
black middle-class community in a crime-prone, economically unstable inner-city 
neighborhood on Chicago's South Side.  She asserts that this group's family-oriented, 
crime-averse values align with those of black middle-class suburban dwellers. 
Further, she argues that the urban black middle-class is neither as spatially distant nor 
economically disparate from the black suburban middle-class as social scientists have 
                                                
8. Walter R. Allen, "African American Family Life in Societal Context: Crisis and 
Hope," Sociological Forum: Official Journal of the Eastern Sociological Society 10, 





reported and the suburban residents have believed themselves to be.  
 Pattillo-McCoy also enables a more subjective, non-statistical view of the 
black middle-class as a whole, defining them as people who "mow their lawns, go to 
church, marry, vote, work, own property," and who "labor diligently to maintain their 
families, their investments, their neighborhood, and to further their achievements."9 
However, she also notes that whether the black middle-class lives in the midst of 
poorer, crime-ridden neighborhoods, as do the families in her study, or in quieter, 
more economically secure and socially homogenous suburban housing developments, 
neither group is as economically secure as the white middle class. "The public 
celebration of black middle-class ascendance has perhaps been too hasty," Pattillo-
McCoy suggests.10 
 Discrimination in employment, wages, lending, and housing policies, as well 
as ineffective anti-poverty programs continue to keep the black middle-class from 
securing the same degree of social and economic stability as whites. Discussing the 
possibility of residential integration as a start to enabling greater degrees of black 
stability, she is careful to stipulate that "blacks, like whites, also indicate preferences 
for residential situations in which they are the majority," and "that there also are 
social, cultural, and psychological rewards to living in a neighborhood that celebrates 
                                                
9. Mary Pattillo-McCoy, Black Picket Fences: Privilege and Peril Among the Black 
Middle Class (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 5.  
 




black history and culture."11 
 Evidence from Prince George’s County echoes some of Pattillo-McCoy's 
research in Chicago. Prince George's County's post-1970s middle-class suburbs were 
economically fragile, and black leaders' acrimonious, class-motivated debates 
regarding increased busing in 1979, discussed in Chapter Twelve, seem futile, as both 
class distinctions among blacks and wealth gains were negligible.   
 My findings lead me to concur with Pattillo-McCoy’s argument that black 
middle-class communities up to the mid-1970s were socially ordered around kinship 
and friendship. Moreover, in Prince George’s – not unlike the communities in her 
study – neighborhoods have perpetuated familial and generational connectedness into 
the twenty-first century, even as new residents representing different national, ethnic, 
and economic demographics, as well as conflicting communal values, arrived. In 
Prince George's County, this pattern is evidenced in the many community-day 
celebrations held annually in North Brentwood, Lakeland, North Englewood, 
Glenarden, Carsondale, and other historically black neighborhoods. More than 
gatherings for the current residents, these events reunite at least eight generations of 
former neighbors, residents, friends, and classmates. Nostalgia also motivated several 
residents of Glenarden to organize in 2010 an annual reunion of the thousands of 
students from multiple black neighborhoods who attended DuVal High during the 
1970s, the decade that saw the first significant increase in the percentages of students 
                                                
 




attending desegregated schools, as well as the highest percentages of desegregation in 
consecutive years.12  
 Neighborhood dynamics also were significant in the research of education 
scholar Deirdre Dougherty, who contends that educational policies since Brown were 
"underpinned by assumptions of the inferiority of black educational and residential 
spaces." Analyzing the attitudes of Prince George's County policy makers toward 
Model Cities communities, which included Fairmount Heights, Dougherty writes:  
The way these racialized spaces came to be represented both reflected and 
reproduced the general perception of a lack of qualified educators in the black 
community which, among other factors, continued to ensure that the 
integration of schools would be a one-way endeavor. Moreover, this had also 
naturalized the idea of black students’ educational inferiority.13  
  
 This research also joins the well-known narratives that came out of Little 
Rock and Boston, as well as many lesser-known narratives throughout the country, in 
exposing the persistent and hegemonic nature of white resistance to desegregation. In 
revealing the interactions between community, policy makers, and government, it 
also connects with desegregation scholarship that explores the ways in which African 
Americans interpreted the actions of their school districts; advocated for their 
                                                
12. Cheryl LaChae Jones, "Must Achievement Gaps Persist? The Struggle for 
Educational Reform in Prince George's County, Maryland," (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Maryland College Park, 2011 (accessed September 29, 2017 
http://hdl.handle.net/1903/11703.) 
 
13. Deirdre Dougherty, “Desegregation in a 'Model City': School Closure and the 
Abstract Space of Black Schooling in Prince George’s County, Maryland, 1968,” 
Paper presented at the History of Education Society Annual Meeting, St. Louis, 








children, schools, and communities; and strategized to directly engage with policy 
makers and influence the desegregation decision making.  
 Since the Supreme Court's decision in Brown, members of the Prince George's 
County school board had been required to negotiate their personal and political 
beliefs, as well as the conventions of the communities they represented, with the high 
court's conclusion that "the opportunity of education" was a right, and that 
maintaining racially segregated schools inherently and illegally denied that right.14 As 
in many other places around the country, the possibility of desegregating the Prince 
George's County public schools and establishing them as part of a "microcosm of a 
broad and diverse community” was impeded by intentional adherence to southern, 
racial power dynamics, as well as illogical and uninformed interpretations of black 
schools, black families, and black communities.15  
 In exploring racial and cultural identity within the context of school 
desegregation, however, this study joins education scholar David Callejo-Perez in 
contesting the typical depiction of desegregation as a fight between “white resistors” 
and “black activists.” Callejo-Perez argues that people’s feelings on the issue might 
not have been as obvious as skin color, neighborhood, or income.16 Thus, it is 
reasonable to ask not only what school desegregation meant to black Prince George's 
                                                
14. Juan Williams, Thurgood Marshall: American Revolutionary (New York: Times 
Books, 1998), 226.  
 
15. Howell Baum, Brown in Baltimore: School Desegregation and the Limits of 
Liberalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 16.   
 
16. David Callejo-Perez, Southern Hospitality: Identity, Schools, and the Civil Rights 





residents but also the extent to which fostering racial conciliation and a color-blind 
society were their goals, as many have suggested.  
 Blacks in the county and throughout the country grasped the significance of 
eliminating systemic inequities in public education, and equalizing the educational, 
professional, and social opportunities afforded by a formal education. Yet, my study, 
along with the work of such scholars as H. Richard Milner and Tyrone C. Howard – 
asks how African-Americans imagined the dispersal of black children and teachers 
into social space from which they had long been barred would affect the essential 
“nexus between families, neighborhoods, and schools,” and how their notions 
changed, if at all, as desegregation went forward?17  
 As early as 1935, almost two decades before Thurgood Marshall and the legal 
team for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People drove 
home their winning argument in Brown, W.E.B. DuBois derided the benefits of racial 
desegregation in education, suggesting that "a finer, better balance of spirit; an 
infinitely more capable and rounded personality” would result from “putting children 
in schools where they are wanted, and where they are happy and inspired, [rather] 
than thrusting them into hells where they are ridiculed and hated."18 The year after the 
                                                
17. H. Richard Milner and Tyrone C. Howard, "Black Teachers, Black Students, 
Black Communities, and Brown: Perspectives and Insights from Experts," Journal of 
Negro Education 73, no. 3 (Summer 2004): 291. 
 
 
18. W.E.B. DuBois, "Does the Negro Need Separate Schools," Journal of Negro 







Brown decision, the writer and anthropologist Zora Neale Hurston declared in the 
Orlando Sentinel  that she had neither "sympathy nor respect for the `tragedy of 
color’ school of thought." Hurston, whose hometown was Eatonville, Florida, the 
nation's first incorporated all-black town, criticized Marshall and the Supreme Court 
for not addressing what she saw as the larger issue, "enforcing the compulsory 
education provisions for Negroes in the South as is done for white children."19 
 Much of the black public responded to the Brown decision with support and 
appreciation. Benjamin Mays, educator and thought leader in the civil rights 
movement, recalled that after the Brown decision, “people literally got out and danced 
in the streets” in celebration. "The Negro was jubilant," Mays recalled. Yet, Aldon 
Morris points out that Mays also “clearly saw the limitations of the case before the 
decision was rendered … [and Mays] maintained that even if the decision was 
favorable it would apply directly only to the five cases before the Court; the problem 
of residential segregation would remain, and blacks would probably have a tendency 
to withdraw pressure once they had gained the legal right to attend non-segregated 
schools.”20  
 Twenty-first century scholars have challenged the legacy of Brown v. Board 
of Education on a number of grounds. Among its less-than-monumental outcomes 
and effects, observers note, were the undermining tactics of white legislators and 
                                                
19. Zora Neale Hurston, "Letter to the Orlando Sentinel," Orlando Sentinel (August 
11, 1955): accessed March 31, 2016, 
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/letter-to-the-orlando-sentinel. 
  
20. Aldon D. Morris, The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities 





judges across the country, who, among other things, approved the reappropriation of 
public funds to private schools that excluded black students, cut off resources to 
schools in black communities, suspended school bus service for black children, and 
caused both the resegregation of public schools and "the relegation of blacks to an 
inferior public school system."21  
 Civil rights attorney Derrick Bell came to view Brown as "a disaster for the 
schooling of black children," saying in 2004 that he regretted his success in arguing 
school desegregation cases as an NAACP attorney in the 1960s, victories that 
"resulted in the closing of black schools and the dismissal of thousands of black 
teachers and administrators." Bell recalled that "when the black children who were 
the beneficiaries of those court orders were admitted to previously all-white schools, 
they often faced hostility and only infrequently found a teaching environment that 
was conducive to their needs. … Black children were disproportionately disciplined, 
and there was little attention given to black cultural interests."22  
  
 A number of studies also have asserted that blacks' perceptions of 
desegregation cannot be processed solely through the lens of Thurgood Marshall's 
NAACP, which projected racial integration in schools as a seismic social movement 
capable of ending racial segregation and injustice in the larger society. Yet, the 
success or failure of school desegregation must be explored at a micro level. 
                                                
21. Callejo-Perez, 119.  
 
22. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., "I Keynote Addresses – The Unintended Lessons in Brown v. 





Historians Andrew Highsmith and Ansley Erickson take this approach in revealing 
how local government officials in Flint, Michigan, from the 1930s into the early 
1970s, engaged in the practices of "splitting and joining," drastically manipulating 
school district boundaries to ensure that black and white students in adjacent 
neighborhoods attended separate schools, while also deliberately creating suburban 
enclaves of whiteness and social democracy that also were characterized by racial 
exclusivity.  
 Following this rationale of calculated segregation, I argue that the assertions 
of Prince George's County school officials that residential segregation was solely to 
blame for the extent of segregated schooling only "mask[ed]" the government’s role 
in upholding the color line."23  
 The school board in Flint revealed as earnest a commitment to segregation as 
to community spirit, refusing to relieve overcrowding in white schools that were 
located near black or integrated neighborhoods and justifying their actions by 
claiming black schools taught only remedial curricula. School district leaders in 
Prince George's County used similar rationale in refusing to enforce the transfer of 
white students from the predominantly white, overcrowded Bladensburg High to the 
predominantly black, under-enrolled Fairmont Heights High, deeming the 
instructional programs at Fairmont Heights to be inadequate.  
                                                
23. Andrew R. Highsmith and Ansley T. Erickson, “Segregation As Splitting, 
Segregation as Joining: Schools, Housing, and the Many Modes of Jim 





 In a separate study, Erickson also argued that analyses of desegregation's 
successes and failures must consider how local planning and development agencies 
collaborated to ensure segregated neighborhoods would remain that way, actions that 
provided school district officials the means and rationale to sustain segregation. "In 
Nashville," Erikson explained, "statistical desegregation was tried, and in many 
respects secured. But what was not tried was desegregation in the context of a robust 
commitment to equality of educational opportunity, with careful attention to the 
quality of students’ experiences in schools and the continued effort toward 
desegregation alongside public recognition of and value for all of a metropolis’s 
communities and children."24  
 My study of Prince George’s County concludes, similarly, that a strong 
commitment to equality of educational opportunity was never in evidence. Yet, the 
situation in Prince George’s was very different from Nashville in that the 
desegregation effort ultimately changed the racial composition of the county. The 
trajectory of race relations in Prince George’s turned out to be so different from that 
in Nashville that my study remains unique. 
 Erikson goes on to assert that defining education equality in the twenty-first 
century requires asking different questions, an imperative political scientist Alvin 
Thornton and educator Eva Wells Chunn made in their 1988 discussion on the effort 
to ensure education equality in Prince George's County in the years after the 1972 
desegregation court order, when the county's steadily increasing black population 
                                                
24. Ansley T. Erickson, Making the Unequal Metropolis: School Desegregation and 
Its Limits. Historical Studies of Urban America (Chicago: University of Chicago 




eclipsed the fast-declining white population, making it impossible to maintain court-
ordered racial quotas within county schools.  
 My inquiry into blacks' education activism before court-ordered busing also 
joins  Zebulon Miletsky's look at the fight for education equality in Boston, which 
black Bostonians had begun waging two decades before Brown  and which girded 
them for the city's busing battle of the 1970s. Miletsky challenges the gilded narrative 
of Boston as the nation's seat of democracy and social civility, observing that "the 
presentation of a counter-narrative that foregrounds black community agency and 
activism helps to construct a more complete historical understanding of the role 
played by those residents who were most affected by the resistance to the [1970s 
busing] court order and least mentioned in most accounts of school desegregation—
black Bostonians."25 Centering the communities and activists in Prince George's 
County prior to court-ordered busing furthers Miletsky's intent to bring to the 
forefront the stories that have been obscured by the sheer scale of the legal dramas 
desegregation sparked.   
 Historian Tess Bundy also focuses on a lesser-known Boston desegregation 
story, assessing compulsory desegregation as a possible cause for the dissolution of 
black communities and their institutions. Bundy observes that desegregation 
disregarded the value of black schools, which had "provided local communities 
important central meeting places, represented a crucial site of communal cooperation 
                                                
25. Zebulon V. Miletsky, “Before Busing: Boston's Long Movement for Civil Rights 
and the Legacy of Jim Crow in the ‘Cradle of Liberty,’” Journal of Urban History 43, 





and ownership, and offered tangible economic opportunities for African Americans, 
both as sources of employment for educators and as means to ensure students' future 
economic mobility."26 She asserts that Boston's African-American communities 
before the early 1970s had steadily pressed their local officials to guarantee the rights 
enacted by Brown. Black parents were neither “passive victims nor apathetic 
bystanders” regarding the desegregation of schools, but assertively interacted with the 
people who were making the policies affecting their children's schooling, Bundy 
asserts.27  
 Further arguing that Boston's black parents were education activists before the 
city's busing controversy of the mid-1970s, Bundy reveals that black Bostonians were 
not primarily driven by a desire for desegregation but by a determination to directly 
shape their children's education. She also uncovers how black parents, challenging the 
conventional assumption that policy makers would act in their children's best interest, 
put before city officials their own informed knowledge of what was best for their 
children.28 
 My evidence reveals that Prince George's County's black communities were 
deeply committed to public education and succeeded in making it available to their 
children a century before Brown. However, the more fervent and steady efforts to 
                                                
26. Lauren Tess Bundy, "The Schools Are Killing Our Kids! The African American 
Fight for Self-Determination in the Boston Public Schools, 1949-1985,” Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Maryland College Park, 2014 (accessed August 12, 2016 
doi:10.13016/M26S3K.y.). 
 
27. Ibid, 2. 
 




secure equality in the education of black children came after Brown. Black 
Bostonians, on the other hand, had launched their community-based activism in the 
post-World War II period. Driven in Boston by grassroots, culture-centered groups, 
and in Prince George's County by civic and civil rights organizations, the black 
residents of both communities employed direct action to break through institutional 
racism and secure educational rights.  
 Although not all black parents in either jurisdiction felt comfortable engaging 
with the personnel at their children's desegregated schools, some parents in both 
school districts found individual advocacy for their children to be essential in forcing 
policy changes. Nonetheless, within a decade of the court's initial desegregation order 
in Prince George's County, class-based power struggles among blacks destroyed the 
opportunity for greater parental and community empowerment.  
 Desegregation in Boston also led Mathew Delmont and Jeanne Theoharis to 
assert that white Bostonians' resistance to court-ordered busing provided them, and 
city officials, with an acceptable rationale to publicly oppose the very idea of school 
desegregation. The authors show that, contrary to long-accepted narratives, 
opposition to busing in the 1960s and 1970s was not concentrated within ethnic and 
working-class white communities but also spread throughout middle-class and 
wealthy white communities. Similarly, in Prince George's County, intense opposition 
to desegregation and busing, racist rhetoric, and obstructionist intentions 
characterized the majority-white, solidly professional, middle-class suburb of 
Cheverly, where schools superintendent William S. Schmidt lived, as much as it did 




 Discussing the influence of community on blacks' attitudes toward 
desegregation, Callejo-Perez has argued that “place shaped the psychology of black 
identity prior to the integration of schools."29 He cites Barbara J. Fields' claim that 
place "is a psychological condition that 'grew up out of concrete historical conditions 
and interests.'"30 Fields, following John Hope Franklin, suggests that blacks were as 
susceptible as whites to the South's "well-defined codes of conduct."31 An apt 
example of this conduct is found in an October 9, 1915, article on the Prince George's 
County Colored Schools, published in the Washington Bee, a weekly newspaper that 
covered black community news in and around the city. James F. Armstrong, who was 
the black Supervisor of Colored Schools in Prince George's County intermittently 
between 1914 and 1919, had "received both praise and criticism from the local black 
press and the constituents of the Fairmount Heights School,"32 where he also oversaw 
the industrial training department. Armstrong was known to abuse his authority over 
the black staff he supervised.  
 According to the article in the Bee, when he found out one of the school's 
black trustees had mishandled the hiring of a new teacher, Armstrong informed the 
                                                
29. Callejo-Perez, 13.  
 
30. Ibid, 10. 
 
31. Ibid, 12. This notion is based in John Hope Franklin's theory of a unique, 
fabricated Southern consciousness, a "unification of nationalism and honor," that 
employs order as a means of deflecting "the slightest suggestion of irregularity in his 
honesty and integrity."  
 
32. The article references Fairmount Heights Elementary School, which opened in 





white superintendent about the matter and was "ordered" to go to the school and 
resolve the situation. Referring to Armstrong as "the messenger supervisor," the 
October 5 edition of the Bee offered a summary of the meeting he had with the parties 
involved: 
R.F. Plummer, who came here to represent a teacher at Fairmount Heights, 
was successful in defeating William F. Armstrong and one of his pet trustees, 
who doesn't know where he stood. The citizens of Prince George's County are 
making a fight to remove Armstrong, and have a representative board of 
trustees for Fairmount Heights appointed. The consensus of opinion here is 
that this is Armstrong's last year. There is a great deal of dissatisfaction 
against him. His patronizing attitude is disgusting colored people here. All of 
Armstrong's pet propositions were defeated. He has lost with the people. He 
never was their choice.33   
 
 Black Prince Georgians negotiating desegregation and its meanings fifty years 
later also were motivated to rebuke such patronage.  
  
 Urban geographer Joe T. Darden, examining perceptions of communities and 
schools from another angle, concluded in a 1981 study that "racial differences in 
attitudes toward schools are associated not only with race per se but also with the 
racial composition of neighborhoods."34 Blacks in Prince George's, whose 
neighborhoods through the 1970s were largely segregated, shared group values and a 
group identity that influenced their sense of citizenship, as well as their attitudes 
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toward education, school, and desegregation. Motivated by social and civic 
imperatives, and racial pride, they aspired to recast an identity that, as Callejo-Perez 
argued, had been built upon an oppressive social reality, and they saw desegregating 
schools as a way to activate that new identity.35  
 In sum, in this thesis I argue that African-American parents, teachers, 
students, and community leaders in Prince George’s County generally supported 
desegregation in the period between 1954 and 1974 but faced it with trepidation and 
ambivalence because, for all its promise of greater resources and social equality, 
desegregation also threatened violence; discrimination within schools; the loss of the 
community cohesion and solidarity that supported black children in a racist society; 
the loss of employment opportunities for educators and support staff; and the loss of 
curricula and extra-curricular activities that valued black lives and refuted racist 
versions of American culture.   
 I also argue that over time ambivalence manifested in different ways among 
different groups of African-American parents. When some saw the voluntary way that 
desegregation was going to be implemented in the early 1960s, for instance, very few 
participated. Most did not see this method as one that promised to improve the 
educational opportunities of their children. Still, the lack of enthusiasm for a 
particular desegregation plan did not reflect opposition to the Brown decision. 
Moreover, I argue that retaining schools in black communities was a major 
commitment of African-American Prince Georgians, and that when methods of 
                                                





desegregation meant the loss of schools in black neighborhoods, black parents, 





Chapter 2: Social and Historical Contexts 
Black Americans during the first half of the twentieth century resided in major urban 
centers, busy small towns, and rural communities. In addition, they resided in 
geographically distinct semi-rural communities on the immediate outskirts of urban 
centers. The economic and physical infrastructures of these sub-urban communities 
were typically less stable than the same in white communities, yet these spaces 
enabled black families to live day to day independent of white influence on such 
essential life functions as socializing, mating, child rearing, worshipping, and 
schooling. In Prince George's County, Maryland, just outside Washington, D.C., the 
sense of place, ownership, and safety these small communities afforded black citizens 
helped shape and define group and individual identity, and the segregated community 
schools contributed significantly to this process.     
 A century before Brown v. Board of Education, African Americans in Prince 
George's County had established communities and structured their lives within social 
and economic situations that, though not easily distinguishable from the conditions of 
enslavement, enabled their independence, stability, and endurance. After 
emancipation, there was, for instance, little lag in their efforts to secure formal 
education. The first school for black children, funded by the Freedmen's Bureau, 
opened in Bladensburg in 1866, and the school's "black leadership … specifically 
requested a black teacher."36 Over the next several years, at least six more schools, 
some of them affiliated with black United Methodist and African Methodist 
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Episcopal congregations, opened in Upper Marlboro and neighboring towns in the 
southern section of the county, with assistance from the Freedmen's Bureau and the 
Baltimore Association for the Moral and Educational Improvement of Colored 
People. Within the first quarter of the twentieth century, African-American 
communities in the central and northern sections of the county also financed the 
construction of schools and the hiring of teachers. They built homes, churches, and 
communities; worked; helped finance the construction of the schools they attended; 
nurtured families and friendships; and within their own organizations participated in 
the same types of leisure and recreation as whites in the county. 
 
In 1903, the residents of Lakeland, Maryland, a small, turn-of-the century 
black community along U.S. Route 1 and a few minutes' drive from Washington, 
D.C., built a one-room elementary school, which they expanded to two rooms in 
1917. In 1925, with support from the Julius Rosenwald Fund and supplemental 
financing from the county, they constructed an even larger building. Lakeland was 
situated within the municipal boundaries of College Park and directly across from the 
main campus of the University of Maryland. In 1928, Lakeland residents and the 
residents of several other black communities along or near Route 1 pooled their 
savings with county funds and a second Rosenwald grant to build Lakeland High 
School, one of the county's first high schools for blacks. The attendance zone 
stretched about twenty-five miles northward along Route 1, from the black town of 




Howard County, and included no fewer than seven black communities along that 
route.  
 Historian Andrew Wiese found that by 1940, “more than a million African 
Americans lived in suburban areas, and suburbanites represented one-fifth of the 
black population in the metropolitan United States.”37 Included in that number were 
residents of several early Prince George’s County communities, including North 
Brentwood, Glenarden, and Fairmount Heights. North Brentwood was developed on 
land that set aside by its owner, a Union army officer, for purchase by the black 
soldiers who had served in his unit. It became in 1924 the county's first incorporated 
all-black municipality. Fairmount Heights, settled in the 1910s and 1920s at 
Washington, D.C.'s northeast-southeast point, was incorporated in 1935 and was a 
particularly enterprising and politically active community. The town of Glenarden, a 
trolley-car suburb, was first subdivided in the 1910s along the Washington, 
Baltimore, and Annapolis Electric Railroad and became an incorporated municipality 
in 1939. Lincoln and Buena-Vista, adjacent communities, also were situated along the 
WB&A line. Thomas Junius Calloway, an American statesman, former college 
president, and friend of Booker T. Washington, cleverly marketed the communities' 
bucolic lots by offering free train tickets to passengers passing through Lincoln 
traveling to and from Baltimore. 
 By the 1960s, with the security and stability afforded by veterans' benefits and 
federal government employment, African Americans who had grown up in those and 
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other early Prince George's black communities situated within ten miles north and 
east of D.C., were resettling in those communities or moving into new housing 
developments within close proximity to them. Wiese notes that "black communities 
established by one generation served as the geographic and social foundation for the 
next.”38 Young black families in the District of Columbia desiring suburban space to 
rear their families also were settling in Prince George's newer housing communities. 
Allowing for the illegal real estate practices that "steered" black homebuyers to all-
black communities,39 these black residents were deliberate in choosing segregated 
neighborhoods, where "they could reap the benefits of middle-class lifestyles, could 
stay connected to African- American cultural traditions promoted by other black 
suburbanites, and, quite significantly, shield themselves from much of the racial 
bigotry they would face in white suburbs," historian Robert Gregg explains.40  
 Conrad Briggs of Glenarden recalls that it was this sense of racial 
consciousness that in 1963 drew his father to Prince George's County from 
Washington, D.C. Five years old in 1963 when his parents moved the family from 
Benning Heights in Washington's southeast neighborhood to a newly built home in 
Glenarden, not a half-hour away, Conrad reflected on his father's motivations:  
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He was looking for security. He wanted to be around black people. He wanted 
his own home. He wanted to be involved in his government. He wanted a say 
… that feeling of enfranchisement, I think he would say, never having had 
that before, [but, as a renter,] having that, 'A white man can walk into your 
house anytime.' Not in Glenarden! This little enclave offered him that.41 
  
 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Prince George's had "rapidly develop[ed] as 
a bedroom community of Washington, D.C." First maintaining a post-Reconstruction 
decline that reached a census-record low of eight percent in 1960, the black 
population rebounded to fourteen percent in 1970.42 In 1968, Carl Sims of the 
Washington Post, offered a thoughtful and nuanced socioeconomic classification of 
blacks in Prince George's County: (1) middle class blacks "seek to prevent formation 
of a new ghetto, are wary of 'black power' separatism and are willing to seek solutions 
to their problems through traditional channels; (2) the working class "are willing to 
try conventional channels but are quick to read racism in bureaucracy and delay"; and 
(3) rural residents, "bound most tightly by a legacy of poverty and discrimination … 
are just beginning to be heard."43 
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 Many suburban black families' preference for living among other blacks 
combined with de facto and de jure segregation to limit black children's interactions 
with whites. Until court-ordered school desegregation in the 1970s brought them into 
daily interaction with significant numbers of white children and adults, much of what 
black children in Prince George’s County knew about whites they learned from older 
relatives, neighbors, and teachers who encountered whites in work and public spaces, 
although likely in discriminatory contexts. Television after the 1950s also informed 
young black children about white Americans, although from a narrow and 
propagandistic perspective. Still, it was within their homes, communities, churches, 
schools, and organizations that black children's racial and cultural identity, as well as 
attitudes, were defined and developed. 
 Benay Gray Hawkins and twins Maxine and Delphine Gross grew up in the 
late 1950s and the 1960s in the all-black community of Lakeland, in College Park, 
near the University of Maryland. Until junior high, they attended school within their 
community and experienced their community and schools as nurturing and protective. 
Benay, who was born in 1954, the year of Brown, recalls, "Black and white wasn't 
ingrained in us." Getting on the streetcar to go shopping downtown, she says she 
"can't even remember seeing white people. … You didn’t focus on them being white 
and you being black." She believes Lakeland "definitely" sheltered her from racism, 
just as many black families and communities shielded children from the racial 
dystopia that writer Ralph Ellison depicted in 1952's Invisible Man.  
 If anything, for some in the community, Lakeland allowed a sense of utopia. 




says.44 Delphine recalls a few whites coming into the community in the early 1970s, 
including an insurance man collecting policy premiums, and, in the 1960s, white 
University of Maryland students, "probably from the school of education," who 
volunteered as tutors for elementary children. Black students from the university 
eventually took over the tutoring program, and "the lessons started to focus more on 
issues of black culture," Delphine remembers. "Growing up in Lakeland gave me a 
sense of myself," she adds. "It just never occurred to me that white people were better 
than we were. We were cherished."45 Maxine notes, "We had everything we 
needed."46 
Charles James' racial identity was cemented in the early 1960s within his 
family home in Lanham; at the segregated Lincoln Elementary; and at the family 
church in Washington, D.C. Lanham was then a large area of incorporated and 
unincorporated communities in close proximity to the black neighborhoods of 
Lincoln, Vista, Carsondale, and Glenarden; and also near Glen Dale and Bowie, 
where blacks and whites had long lived in segregated sections. His parents had 
migrated to the area from Texas in the mid-1940s, and for them, Charles says, "being 
here and not in Texas was like, 'We made it!'" His father built their home on property 
that was purchased from a local black minister, Rev. Johnson, who "had in their 
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contract that you couldn't sell it to white people," he remembers his father telling 
him.47  
Charles first left the segregated environs of home and his all-black school and 
church in 1967, at the beginning of fifth grade, when he was desegregated to Glenn 
Dale Elementary. However, he said he "felt better" within segregation. "At church, I 
always got picked to do stuff. I was always picked to be in a play. I was in Bible 
study and choir. And the same thing at Lincoln. So, I felt, comfortable. I felt people 
valued me."48  
His first white teacher at Glenn Dale was "real tough" but also constructively 
challenging: "That was the first class I had where school was really hard," Charles 
says, adding, "It was better than I thought it would be. They weren't smarter than me," 
which might suggest his teachers at Lincoln had prepared him well. Charles recalls 
that while his parents thought desegregated schools were better, they viewed the issue 
"from a purely equivalency standpoint."49 His parents’ qualified support reflected 
blacks' conflicted feelings about desegregation, as they had to weigh the possible 
gains of "equivalency" of resources against the probable obstacles and possible 
dangers black children would encounter. While fighting for civil rights and balanced 
representation had long been an endeavor of black America, and although many 
endorsed the integrationist vision of Thurgood Marshall and interpreted compulsory 
                                                








desegregation as a social good, their support for compulsory desegregation was not 
inevitable nor without ambivalence.  
 Residing in communities that had "flourished despite the limitations of a less 
than hospitable society,”50 and valuing those communities as they did, many black 
residents of Prince George's County, finding Brown to be "a dubious victory,"51 met 
school desegregation with as much trepidation as optimism. They forthrightly 
advocated for fair and rational desegregation planning even in the two decades before 
the strongly contested federal court order that activated full-scale desegregation in 
January 1973. When the court order directed the transfer of about 32,823 of the 
district's 162,000 students, including 12,000 first-time bus riders,52,53 children who 
lived on adjacent blocks, whose backyards ran together, and who played and rode 
bikes together, were suddenly dispersed to different schools throughout the expansive 
county. Neighborhoods and towns such as Glenarden, which "had traditions" and 
were "nurturing,"54 provided stability and continuity when children found the changes 
rendered by court-ordered racial quotas and new attendance boundaries to be 
confounding and sometimes disappointing. Conrad Briggs recalls dreading the 
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midyear, court-ordered transfer in January 1973, which reassigned him and his ninth-
grade classmates at Thomas Johnson Junior High, black and white, to he says as 
many as five different schools. As a result of desegregation planning between the 
mid-1960s and mid-1970s, Conrad alone attended five schools – Glenarden Woods 
and Ardmore elementary schools, Thomas Johnson and Beltsville junior high schools, 
and DuVal High School.55  
 Barrett Matthews was in the middle of second grade at Glenarden Woods 
Elementary, his neighborhood school, when he was desegregated ten miles away to 
Whitehall Elementary in Bowie, which was near a large housing development that 
had only a few years earlier infamously barred black home buyers.56 After leaving 
Glenarden Woods, Barrett did not attend school again with most of his Glenarden 
neighbors until junior high school. He remembered, though, as did others, that their 
communities made the dramatic changes, the separation from their homes, schools, 
teachers, and classmates, the changes in routine, feel less jolting. Living in Glenarden 
the rest of the time, "you'd still see each other at the [Martin Luther] King site or the 
rec," Barrett remembered, referring to Glenarden's two community centers. "We also 
played Boys' Club ball together, and we were still, well, Glenarden."57 For Conrad 
Briggs, forging good friendships across racial lines did not minimize the significance 
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of neighborhood identity: "By the time you got out of DuVal," Conrad said, you still 
were a product of your community. Glenarden proud!"58   
 When Sandra White Minor voluntarily enrolled in Bladensburg High in 1968, 
where she recalled being one of 150 black students out of 2,500, she returned every 
evening to her all-black Glenarden neighborhood, where, she said, "we did the things 
you used to see on TV. You had the mayor and you had parades and you had the Boy 
Scouts. … It was a wonderful place to grow up."59 
The residents of all-black North Brentwood recognized the importance of 
having a gathering place for the town's children after desegregation planning closed 
North Brentwood Elementary school in 1970. The old school's conversion into a 
community center allowed the residents to have a year-round center with "teen club 
and different activities," including "a great Head Start program," North Brentwood 
native Maxine Jennings Gray recalled. It was "a big plus" for the town.60 Her younger 
brother, Fred Jennings, who made his career in the county's parks and recreation 
department, thinks closing the elementary school was an attempt by the county to 
annex North Brentwood. "If you have a public school in your neighborhood, you have 
more civic organizations meeting. … It's just a sense of community when you can go 
to this place, and y'all can sit down and discuss matters. It's like a hub. … They 
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wanted us to merge into their culture and lose our identity, and I don't think people in 
North Brentwood were going to lose their identity to the county."61  
 Black families did desire to maintain connections to other black families, as 
Gregg argued, thus, it is reasonable to explore how they thought the campaign to 
desegregate the nation's schools would affect their communities, their lives, and to a 
greater extent, their children’s lives. 
 Between 1950 and 1970, Prince George's County's population more than 
tripled to just under 661,000, and its black population quadrupled to almost 92,000.62 
Residentially segregated as a result of social custom, discriminatory real estate 
practices, and preference, whites and blacks in Prince George's were more 
demographically similar than they might have readily appeared to be. Throughout the 
1960s, they "grew similar in urbanization, youthfulness, income, upward mobility, 
marital status, and home ownership." By 1969, although black Prince Georgians' 
median household income was almost twenty percent less than whites' household 
income – $10,622 compared with $12,74763 – half of blacks and whites in the county 
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owned the homes in which they lived; and black homeowners under thirty years of 
age purchased homes in the same value range as white homeowners.64  
 From the mid-1960s through the 1970s, Prince George's County transformed 
from rural in character and function to solidly suburban. Middle-income black 
families from Washington, D.C., moved into the county's older black neighborhoods, 
as well as its newer housing developments that were being sold exclusively to black 
families. Younger, working-class, and lower-income-earners in Washington, D.C.'s 
southeastern and northeastern quadrants were drawn to the affordable garden-style 
apartment complexes in the county's central region, a significant portion of which 
bordered those areas of the city.  
  Living between two major cities, Baltimore and Washington, D.C., blacks in 
Prince George's were neither isolated nor insulated from events taking place in the 
nation. They read the cities' major white newspapers and the publications of the black 
press. The influential Afro-American was founded in Baltimore, birthplace of 
Thurgood Marshall, and it published bi-weekly editions there and in Washington, 
D.C. It had been in publication for more than sixty years at the time of the Brown 
decision. Through the paper's reporting and advocacy in black communities, readers 
were not only informed of the news, but were encouraged to get behind black 
                                                
  





progressive causes. The paper had, for instance, rallied its readers to support Donald 
Murray's desegregation of the University of Maryland's law school in 1936.65 
 By the fall of 1969, several high schools in Prince George's County had 
experienced racial violence, and Bladensburg High – with an estimated 300 to 500 
blacks among its 2,400 students – quite noticeably. For two consecutive years it had 
been the scene of fighting between whites and blacks. Yet, white parents in the town 
of Cheverly, whose children attended Bladensburg High, were less concerned about 
the violence there than they were about their children's scheduled desegregation of the 
all-black Fairmont Heights High the next year, where they thought they would 
encounter "a kind of racial and social antagonism" and "a climate of resentment."66  
  Meanwhile, a news reporter visiting Fairmont Heights High found that "time 
and time again in interviews, parents expressed as their overriding concern the 
possibility that desegregation might bring racial violence. The price of desegregation, 
they fear, could be disorder in class rooms and halls, intervention by white police as 
at Bladensburg,"67 wrote David Hardy of the Washington Post. 
 Black parents' fears of violence were stoked not only by national tragedies and 
school violence, but also by the county police force's reputation for brutality and 
harassment against blacks throughout the region. The county swore in its first two 
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black officers in February 1968.68 However, the police department's notoriety for 
assaults on blacks prompted the Maryland Human Relations Council in the summer 
of 1970, at the request of a group called Concerned Black Citizens of Prince George's 
County, to ask county commissioners to "study possible changes in the county police 
force's relations with minorities."69 The same group had led a protest rally at the 
county courthouse the previous fall to push for further investigation into the death of 
a Fairmount Heights man killed by police, and also to ask for the establishment of a 
citizens review board.70  
 Police relations with black county residents were so uneasy that when the 
town of Glenarden was trying in the mid-1960s to annex a new housing development 
into which black families were moving, town officials used as a selling point the fact 
that Glenarden had its own municipal police unit. Their reasoning, Conrad Briggs 
explains, was, "You call the police, your first encounter is going to be with somebody 
who lives in your town, somebody's who's accountable to you, not to the county."71  
 The county police were not alone in stoking fear within black communities, 
which were conspicuous targets for white supremacist groups that operated in the 
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county, neighboring Montgomery County, throughout the state, and just across the 
city line in northern Virginia. In 1967, between March and July, the town of Laurel, 
Maryland, which sits in Prince George's and Howard counties, saw Ku Klux Klan 
cross burnings at a black cemetery and a black church, and the attempted bombing of 
a black family's home.72 One white separatist directly targeted children for 
intimidation. After the 1968 closing of their community school, North Brentwood 
Elementary, black children had to walk about a mile to Brentwood Elementary in the 
adjacent white community. They faced not only the danger of crossing high-traffic 
intersections, Maxine Jennings Gray remembers, but also intimidation by "a crazy 
man." On December 24, 1970, the Washington Post reported that "a man on several 
occasions handed out 'go back to Africa' literature to black children" on their way to 
school. The Post identified him as a resident of Brentwood who claimed to be the 
national spokesperson for the Minuteman, a white supremacist group.73 
  Maxine, whose son was one of the walkers, remembers worrying about the 
safety of his new commute. "I was one who always felt somebody should be meeting 
them … just the fact of dealing with traffic. They had some crossing guards, but there 
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were still places where there weren't crossing guards. We tried at one time to get 
busing, but they said that we were too close. It wasn't a long enough distance."74 
 Desegregation's promise of educational opportunity required compromises 
and sacrifices that threatened black communities' control over their own spaces, 
homes, and families, inducing frustration that was no less valid and justified than the 
frustration felt by white parents over busing. 
  
                                                
 




Chapter 3: No Troubles 
 
While many black Americans reacted to the Brown vs. Board of Education decision 
with reserved optimism, some lamented the decision, and others viewed it as the 
decisive strategic advantage needed to challenge segregation in their local school 
districts. One year after Brown, the Supreme Court directed school boards to move 
with deliberate intent toward desegregating their districts, but simultaneously 
allowed them to set their own timetables for achieving desegregation. Prince 
George's County Schools Superintendent William S. Schmidt was a native of 
Frederick, Maryland, about eighty miles north and west of Upper Marlboro, the 
Prince George's County seat and location of school district headquarters. A veteran 
educator, Schmidt took advantage of the Supreme Court's vagueness by ignoring the 
directive. He announced his intent to sustain segregated operations in every area of 
the Prince George's County schools.  
 Black parents in Prince George's responded warily, evidence of their 
ambivalence and trepidation toward desegregating schools. Anticipating better 
educational resources and opportunities than those at their own schools, a few blacks 
applied for their children to be transferred to all-white schools under a new freedom-
of-choice policy the school board initiated. Local NAACP leaders encouraged more 
black parents to do the same, while also pressuring the school board for further 
desegregation. Most black parents did not apply for freedom-of-choice transfers, 
however, as a program of new-school construction in black communities provided 




where parents could assume their safety and well being under black teachers and 
within black neighborhoods. Further, when their children attended black schools, 
parents were more assured that their children were safe, had a sense of belonging, 
and were instructed and nurtured within the cultural and social conventions of the 
black community. 
  
 On May 17, 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court, ruling in Brown v. Board of 
Education, pronounced that “in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate 
but equal’ has no place.” Thurgood Marshall, the lead defense attorney for the 
NAACP, had driven home the winning argument in the case, convincing all nine 
justices that maintaining and operating separate public-funded school systems for 
black children and white children denied black children the assurance of equality the 
United States Constitution guaranteed its citizens. The Brown decision created 
unprecedented possibilities for young black and white Americans to share physical 
and social space, and transcend seemingly immutable racial barriers, as they never 
had before.  
 The Baltimore Afro-American, one of Thurgood Marshall's hometown 
newspapers, reported that Marshall called the decision "the greatest victory we have 
ever had." Vivian Carter Mason, president of the National Council of Negro Women, 
said the decision "gives credence to the fact that we are determined to reconcile 
democratic practices with democratic principles."  
 The Afro also reported that some observers were more circumspect. At 
Maryland's Morgan State College, its former president Dwight O. Williams said, "I 




court's decision in the context of international relations, Williams added, "The highest 
court in our land couldn't afford to state to other nations of the world that this is a jim-
crow country legally."75  
 Many black Americans did not take such a wide-angle view of Brown. The 
difference it could make to them would be observed where it mattered most, in their 
local communities. A school girl's angst, as reported in the Afro, put the decision in a 
different perspective: "A little north in Virginia, Barbara Trent, 16, one of the 400 
colored pupils of the Robert R. Moton High school in Farmville, broke down in tears 
when her teacher told her of the decision: 'Our teacher told us it may cost her job. … 
We went on studying history, but things weren't the same, and will never be the 
same."76  
 
 During the 1953-54 school year, the Prince George’s County, Maryland, 
school district was administered by William S. Schmidt, who oversaw an enrollment 
of 37,300 white students and 5,300 black students. He administered a seven-member, 
governor-appointed board of education. Of the district's 104 schools, twenty-four 
were for the black students only, and the remaining for white students only. Schmidt, 
a native of Frederick, Maryland, about ninety miles northwest of the school board 
offices in Upper Marlboro, had been superintendent of the county schools since 1951. 
Announcing in 1955 the board's intent to initiate a voluntary desegregation policy – 
                                                








which let students apply for enrollment to the school of their choice – Schmidt, freely 
interpreting the Supreme Court's directive to the states, boasted that the plan "put full 
responsibility for desegregation on the parents of the child with the School Board 
reserving the right to determine whether or not each individual case is 
administratively feasible."77  
 Prince George’s County schools segregated not only students, but also faculty 
and staff. Schools for black children employed only black teachers, black principals, 
black custodians, and black secretaries. Their supervisors, who were black, worked in 
segregated office space at school headquarters. The same distinctions applied to 
schools for white children and to white employees. Furthermore, to sustain its dual, 
overlapping, racially coded attendance zones, black and white children rode separate 
school buses that traveled the same routes to different schools. The school to which a 
student was assigned depended upon, first, what race the student was, and second, 
where the closest school was for students of his race.  
 Black students and employees in 1954 were under the administrative 
leadership of Doswell E. Brooks, who had been Supervisor of Colored Education 
since 1922. In December 1956, Gov. Theodore McKeldin relieved Brooks of his 
supervisory responsibilities in order to appoint him to the county school board, 
following the death of William J. Griffith, a bondsman from Croome Station who in 
May 1953 had become the first black member of the county board. Both Griffith and 
Brooks were Republicans, as were the governor and the superintendent of schools.78 
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County voters would not begin electing their school board representatives for another 
twenty years. 
 Among black educators, Brooks was viewed similarly to his predecessor, 
James H. Armstrong: as an agent of the white leadership. In the 1970s, a retired 
elementary school principal said Brooks had "stood in the way of the educational 
advancement of Black people" and had not been "held in high esteem by the Black 
community."79  
 Another view of Brooks emerges from a report that historian Carter G. 
Woodson gave at the 1948 convention of the Association for the Study of Negro Life 
and History. Praising the conventioneers for their efforts in "acquainting the members 
of both races with the record of the Negro," Woodson commended Brooks 
specifically, announcing that "Assistant Superintendent of Schools Elmer A. 
Henderson of Baltimore and Supervisor Doswell E. Brooks of Prince George's 
County are likewise giving both material and moral assistance while carrying to the 
members of the white race the proposal that they, too, should become part of the 
movement."80 
 Brooks' demeanor at a January 1957 county school board meeting, the first he 
attended as a member of the body, reveals that he managed his standing with 
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necessary diplomacy and unfounded optimism. Brooks told reporters who asked 
about desegregation, "We have not had any troubles or difficulties yet and I don't 
envision any for the future because the program we have in motion here appears to 
mean the accomplishment of this objective – integration."81 
 Prince George's County Superintendent Schmidt was just as vague on the 
subject, but far less tactful. On May 18, 1954, the day after the Brown decision, he 
joined school district leaders from the Washington, D.C., suburbs at a conference to 
"take a close look at their integration problems." Speaking with the press who 
covered the meeting, Schmidt signaled the do-nothing approach to which he would 
adhere. Blacks living in "predominantly Negro areas" with new schools might not be 
eager to integrate, Schmidt told reporters. "Integration would not be forced on 
Negroes," he said, adding that he could foresee no serious problems "if we sit down 
and try to work out the solution together."82 Schmidt's perception of blacks' possible 
reticence toward integration was accurate, but his motive for suggesting a voluntary 
desegregation plan in Prince George's County was based wholly in his segregationist 
beliefs. 
 Schmidt went on to chair a committee of Maryland’s public school chiefs that 
deliberated, among other topics, the negative effects of segregation on black children 
and the “emotional disturbance it [was] creating in white children by revoking the 
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pre-existing right” they had to attend segregated schools.83 Schmidt's failure to see the 
seminal meaning and intent of Brown and to grasp its compulsory nature until a 
decade later allowed the Prince George's County public schools to remain in a status 
of de jure segregation for another eighteen years. 
 Others in Prince George's, however, clearly understood the social impetus of 
Brown and began discussing the challenges of the legislation, as well as solutions to 
managing them. The Washington Post reported on March 27, 1955, that two large 
Washington-area PTA groups, in Prince George's County and Washington, D.C., 
were moving ahead to "hold workout sessions on better human relations, with 
emphasis on problems of school integration." The Prince George's PTA scheduled a 
daylong "institute on integration" for Saturday, April 2 at Fairmount Heights 
Elementary School, with the keynote address to be given by Furman L. Templeton, 
executive director of the Baltimore Urban League, and a panel discussion to include 
white county school board member Louise Yuill.84 Yet, as it had no plans to 
desegregate the school district, the school board as a whole gave no thought to 
possible changes in the county's racial dynamics.  
  
 A year and two weeks after the Brown decision, on May 31, 1955, the 
Supreme Court provided states with a broad guideline for breaking down their dual 
school systems and racially integrating their schools. The high court directed them to 
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“make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance” with Brown, a directive 
so broad an Associated Press reporter called it a decision that was "likely to keep the 
lawyers arguing for a long, long time." 85  
 Segregationist policy makers, including those in Prince George's, read the lack 
of specificity in the decision, which came to known as Brown II, as a signal to simply 
ignore Brown.86 
 The Prince George's County school board had six weeks earlier appointed 
twenty-two county residents to serve as the Fact-Finding Committee to Study 
Problems of Desegregation. The committee's task was to speak with the communities 
and then recommend a desegregation plan for county schools. Five members of the 
committee were black, including Doswell Brooks, who at the time was still serving as 
superintendent, and Chesley Mack, a College Park councilman who lived in the 
Lakeland community.  
 The members of the board and the committee made a resolution "not to appear 
before citizens groups or other interested persons" to discuss "how desegregation in 
Prince George's County will be designed."87 They were given until July 15 to devise a 
plan. On August 9, seven members of the county branch of the NAACP, including the 
branch founder and president Hester King, attended the school board meeting to hear 
Superintendent Schmidt announce the committee's recommendations and the board's 
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plans for enacting desegregation in the schools. Taking literally its fact-gathering 
mission, the committee collected data that revealed the capacity of all county 
classrooms to absorb enrollment changes, identified schools that could absorb new 
students, and surveyed the community to ascertain attitudes toward school 
desegregation and a need for community education.  Its projections revealed that 
limited classroom capacity would keep the district from thoroughly integrating in the 
fall.  
 However, sharing with the board its evidentiary findings, the committee also 
identified "some schools where school desegregation can be put into effect 
immediately." They advised the board that "the present policy of fixed school 
boundaries can be continued but on an integrated basis"88 and that "a program of 
desegregation should be started as soon as practicable in each school where classroom 
facilities and other conditions permit."89 As a matter of policy, they suggested 
"pupils, irrespective of race, should be allowed to attend the school closest to their 
homes with present exceptions." The committee clarified an exceptional situation to 
be one in which a student was enrolled in a special program not offered at the school 
nearest her home, or in which a twelfth-grade student requested to graduate from the 
high school in which she already was enrolled.90 
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 Schmidt released the report to the press, but he took out the charts that showed 
what enrollment figures would be if all Negro students in the county were assigned to 
white schools, saying that the committee had not taken into consideration that Negro 
schools "would continue to operate and continue to draw students."91 Schmidt's 
exclusion of the data likely revealed his intention to build more schools within black 
communities and to retain race-coded attendance zones. That the committee did not 
project enrollment figures for integrated black schools underscores the general 
perception of desegregation as a one-way process that required action on the part of 
black children only. This perception, itself, is explained by education scholar Robert 
A. Garda, following Derrick Bell's interest-convergence theory. Bell argued that 
whites' support of desegregation was contingent upon it providing a benefit for their 
children. Garda further suggests that "the benevolent, moral, third-party and societal 
justifications for integrating schools simply have not persuaded white parents to 
create diverse schools because, as shown by the interest-convergence theory, parents 
act only out of self-interest." This rationale could be applied to white parents and 
policy makers in Prince George's, who also were motivated by history, convention, 
and civic and social privilege.   
 The Fact-Finding Committee also reported on its informal surveys of white 
and black citizens throughout the county to ascertain their feelings about 
desegregation in schools. The surveys revealed that white county residents preferred 
"gradual" change and "almost all" black residents "wanted desegregation to go into 
effect immediately." Black and white interviewees frequently asked the committee 
                                                




the same questions, including: How will the parents of the two groups get along 
together? Will desegregation include social and after-school activities? Can children's 
activities outside of schools be desegregated before schools are desegregated? What 
effect will desegregation have on the health of white and Negro children?92  
 Although voting at its August 9, 1955, meeting to accept the committee's 
findings, the superintendent and board ignored the recommendations of the fact-
finding committee and announced a tokenistic, voluntary desegregation plan under 
which any student could attend the school of their choice, allowing for available 
space and the board’s right to “delay or deny" the request "if it deem[ed] such action 
wise and necessary.”93 Superintendent Schmidt said the school district had "no 
intention of compelling a student to attend a specific school or deny him the privilege 
of transferring to another."94  
 After the announcement, Hester King told the press the local NAACP would 
take a "wait-and-see" approach to the new policy. "We're not pleased with the fact 
that Supt. William S. Schmidt hasn't set a timetable on his plan, but if he doesn't go 
far enough soon enough, we'll just have to go ahead and get it done the right way," 
King said.95  
   
                                                
 
92. Ibid.  
 
93. Mike Monroney, "Prince George's Schools Take Integration Step," Washington 








 The Thomas family in the all-black town of North Brentwood was among the 
first to apply for a transfer under the new policy. They requested their son Willie's 
transfer to Northwestern High, an all-white school that was closer to his North 
Brentwood home than was Fairmont Heights High, the all-black school his siblings 
and neighbors attended. Willie was among ninety-three black students who applied 
for freedom-of-choice transfers that first year and among the sixty-seven who were 
approved to integrate the county school system in September of the same year.96 The 
school board received no transfer requests from white students. At the time, total 
enrollment in county schools was 49,977, and 6,347 black children were enrolled in 
the twenty-one all-black schools.97  
 The small number of freedom-of-choice applicants did not prove that black 
parents opposed the principle of desegregation as much as it reflected blacks' 
anxieties and apprehension over sending their children into communities where 
blacks had not previously been welcomed, nor into schools about which they had 
little knowledge and where they had neither control nor influence. Even as Brown v. 
Board of Education was being celebrated as a civil rights triumph, it also intensified 
suburban whites' prejudices and the insidious threats white supremacists posed to 
black Americans. During interviews with the United States Commission on Civil 
Rights in 1976, black parents whose children had been enrolled in Prince George's 
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County schools when the free-choice policy was in effect commented on "a general 
atmosphere of fear"98 surrounding desegregation. Others expressed concerns that their 
children "might be the only black child in a school or that their child might be abused, 
scorned, or maybe just tolerated."99  
 Indeed, it was the year after the 1954 desegregation ruling when white 
vigilantes tortured and murdered fourteen-year-old Emmett Till, a black Chicago 
resident who was visiting family in Mississippi. Two years after Till was murdered, 
white resistors to school desegregation in Little Rock, Arkansas, attempted to mob-
attack nine black students who had been selected to integrate the city's Central High 
School. 
 Thurgood Marshall and black psychologist Kenneth Clark had convinced the 
Supreme Court that black children were psychologically harmed by attending 
segregated schools. Yet, blacks were emotionally tied to the schools for which they 
had lobbied, and helped finance and build. The establishment of schools for black 
children during Reconstruction was as much a part of the overcoming theme as 
political representation and the freedom to openly worship. The sense of ownership of 
their schools grew from the experience of claiming their citizenship and exercising 
their freedoms. The freedom to choose also meant having the autonomy to protect 
their children and decide what was in their best interest, which for many families 
meant keeping them in the school located within their own community, with black 









teachers who "'had a way' with black students … deeply understood them and were 
willing to do what was necessary to help the students achieve and to succeed."100 
 Moreover, black parents grasped the arbitrary nature of the freedom-of-choice 
approval process, which granted the board the right to delay or deny a transfer request 
when it found doing so to be "wise and necessary."101 Black families also objected to 
the inadequate effort to publicize the choice plan to white communities, the short 
application period for transfer requests, and the requirement that parents provide 
transportation."102  Racial consciousness, however, did not necessarily conflict with 
support for desegregation. A black school district official interviewed in the 1970s by 
the government's civil rights commission said whites did not think black communities 
and black schools "contained anything of value. They were mistaken, of course, but 
not wrong," he said. "They were victims of the blindness caused by racial 
separation."103 
   
 For freedom-of-choice applicant Willie Thomas of North Brentwood, 
desegregating Northwestern High in the fall of 1955 had been "an opportunity … to 
make a better life for my family," he said in 2004, the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Brown decision. Still residing in Prince George's County, Thomas recalled being 
"continuously harassed" by a white male student and also being a loner until he met a 
                                                











group of "nerds who liked mathematics and science, like me, he said." After 
graduating from Northwestern, Thomas attended the University of Maryland in 
College Park, close to his home and his high school. There, he was the only black 
student majoring in chemical engineering.104  
 His conflict-free years at Northwestern High did not carry over to the black 
students who followed him. In the 1970s, increased rates of desegregation in county 
schools, required by federal intervention, intensified racial tensions and the feelings 
of isolation for some blacks integrating white schools. Leon Jennings, the younger 
brother of Maxine Jennings Gray and Fred Jennings, was involuntarily desegregated 
from Fairmont Heights High to Northwestern High in the 1966-67 school year. 
Describing Leon as both smart and athletic, Fred said he thought being at 
Northwestern would expose his brother to athletic recruiters from white colleges that 
were larger and could offer more opportunities than the historically black colleges 
most athletes at Fairmont Heights would attend. Leon never took to Northwestern 
though. Maxine chuckles remembering her brother confiding in her: "He told me, 'I 
did everything wrong at that school that I could so they'd put me out and send me 
back to Heights.'"105   
     
 As president of the Prince George's County NAACP, Hester King helped keep 
the desegregation of county schools in the foreground of local politics. She 
established the county chapter in 1935 and was known throughout the region for her 
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efforts to combat racial discrimination in schools and other public spaces. In regular 
attendance at school board meetings, she was level headed in the face of 
Superintendent Schmidt's patronizing opposition to desegregation. In news stories 
covering school board meetings, she was often identified as the leader of the 
delegation pushing for progress on desegregation. King agitated the board for a policy 
and a broad plan that would ensure desegregation of schools.   
 At a statewide NAACP meeting in 1956, the legal redress committee reported 
that it had "agreed to press for action in Maryland counties still practicing school 
segregation" and had "also agreed to ask the Federal Bureau of Investigation to probe 
the cross-burning episode on the lawn of Mrs. Hester King, president of the Prince 
George's County Branch recently."106 
 On May 14, 1957, around the same time a judge in Little Rock, Arkansas, was 
refusing further delay of his school desegregation order, King again led the Prince 
George's NAACP in lobbying the school board to abandon its freedom-of-choice 
policy, arguing that the policy had rendered "too little integration." Of the 6,785 black 
students enrolled in county schools, 153 were attending 17 schools that previously 
had all-white enrollments. Superintendent Schmidt claimed that the "gradual and 
orderly" desegregation plan was the reason there had been no racial violence in 
county schools, and that the county had no plans to send black teachers into all-white 
                                                





or mixed-race schools, since "the Supreme Court decision applied only to students, 
and no mention was made of teachers."107  
 While Schmidt handed Hester King excuses, policy makers in Montgomery 
County, Maryland, one of Prince George's adjacent school districts, were 
accomplishing desegregation more directly, having abandoned its free-choice policy 
after two years. Slowly but not without animosity and tension, the Montgomery 
school board moved forward, realizing they "should do what was best for the 
education of children, not what would be least disturbing or most comfortable for the 
community," former Montgomery County school board member Rose Kramer said in 
a 1961 interview.108  
 By the 1960-61 school year, 72.9 percent of Montgomery County's 3,230 
black students had been integrated into formerly all-white schools. During the same 
school year, only six percent of Prince George's County's 7,800 black students were 
in desegregated schools. The county's black leadership expressed disappointment in 
the small numbers of black parents who had applied for transfers through the 
freedom-of-choice policy, but they also acknowledged black families' "satisfaction 
with the new Negro schools." Fourteen had been built since 1951 to accommodate the 
area's post-war population boom and address overcrowding that led to several black 
and white elementary schools holding daily classes in two shifts. Black parents, 
conflicted over the slow pace of desegregation and the need for better facilities and 
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resources welcomed new schools for black children. A black county resident looking 
back at the 1960s during a 1976 interview with the federal civil rights commission, 
said black parents had seen "how hard it was to get into white schools and decided it 
would be better to have their children go to a new black school close to home than 
travel halfway across the county to an old black school."109 Yet, there also was 
skepticism surrounding new-school construction. Another black parent told 
commission interviewers they thought "new black schools and classroom additions 
were deliberately constructed at the direction of the administration to 'contain' the 
black student population."110 
 In the spring of 1961, Hester King had grown tired of what she viewed as the 
school board's token gestures and accommodationist policies. "I really can't approve 
of the school board's leaving this whole problem in the hands of parents," she told a 
reporter.111 Later that year, King resigned her position as head of the Prince George's 
County NAACP but remained active in desegregation efforts. On the morning of 
February 26, 1962, her husband of fifty years shot and killed her after two days of 
arguing about her work with the NAACP, he claimed. The bewildering circumstances 
of her death notwithstanding, King's "wise counsel"112 continued to inspire younger 
civil rights workers in the county, including her predecessor the Rev. Perry Smith, 
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and her son Arthur King, who in 1966 ran for a seat in the Maryland House of 
Delegates and became Prince George's County's first black representative in the state 
legislature.113 In March 1973, Arthur's bullish support for school desegregation 
influenced State Senator Steny H. Hoyer and other state legislators to hold the line 
against a conservative, anti-busing contingency attempting to gain control of the 
county school board, although the legislators' efforts failed.114  
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Chapter 4:  Petitioning 
 
When in 1961 black parents began to question the school board's policies and 
intentions regarding desegregating county schools, the board responded with 
nonchalance. One black family's legal challenge to the school board's freedom-of-
choice policy revealed how deep socio-cultural roots and community ties provoked 
conflicting attitudes among black parents trying to secure educational equality for 
their children. These attitudes nonetheless eventually coalesced into a large-scale 
group effort to demand from the school board a more comprehensive desegregation 
policy that would recognize the value of black schools, equalize disruptions for black 
and white communities, and ensure a high-quality education to all. 
  
 In the early 1960s black parents addressing the county school board regarding 
desegregation often were met with indifference and board members' ignorance of 
school policies. A 1976 federal Civil Rights Commission report on school 
desegregation in Prince George's County documented the foresight of Lakeland 
parents who in July 1961 questioned the rationale of a plan to transfer their children 
from the segregated and aging Lakeland Junior High to yet another segregated school 
– the brand new, soon-to-open Mary McLeod Bethune Junior High, which was five 
miles away. According to the commission report, Lakeland residents recognized the 
plan "as another action calculated to confine the largest possible number of black 
students to all-black schools."115   
                                                




 At the school board meeting on August 8, 1961, L.L. Wilson of the 
Carsondale Civic Association, a black community between Glenarden and Lanham, 
and Enoch Sandidge of Lakeland attended the school board meeting to ask why some 
parents whose children were granted transfers had to transport them to school while 
school bus transportation was provided for other transferred children. A reporter 
covering the meeting noted that no one answered the parents' question. Only after the 
meeting, the paper noted, did Schmidt tell a reporter buses were not provided for 
black or white students who transferred out of their attendance areas. Wilson asked 
the board why principals were required to sign students' transfer requests and if 
children enrolling in county schools after the freedom-of-choice transfer deadline 
would be assigned to a school "on the basis of race." Board chairman W. Carroll 
Beatty told Wilson he would have to wait for an answer while the board studied the 
issues.116 Board members' casual and dismissive attitudes did not go unnoticed. Later 
in the decade, as county residents began pushing for an elected school board, a 
reporter observed that "the combination of a highly able Superintendent and a 
comparatively passive Board has resulted in critics accusing the Board of being a 
rubber-stamp outfit."117  
 During the same meeting in August 1961, Lakeland resident Dervey Lomax, a 
College Park councilman representing the Lakeland community, pressed the school 
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board to reconsider his freedom-of-choice transfer application for his son, which the 
board had denied the previous summer. During the 1959-60 school year, the Lomax 
child had attended kindergarten at an integrated, privately run cooperative that 
operated out of the county's Beltsville Elementary School.118 After kindergarten, his 
parents used the freedom-of-choice policy to apply for his enrollment into first grade 
at Beltsville Elementary, a county public school less than five miles north of 
Lakeland. The school board denied the application, noting that the Lomax family 
lived within sight of its nearest county public school, Lakeland Elementary. After 
hiring a private tutor to instruct the child in his first-grade year, 1960-61, the family, 
still desiring the child's enrollment in an integrated school, applied in the summer of 
1961 for a freedom-of-choice transfer to Seat Pleasant Elementary, nearly ten miles 
from Lakeland. The school board denied the request. Superintendent Schmidt said he 
had received about one hundred freedom-of-choice applications over the summer and 
denied only the Lomax request because the family home and the local school were so 
close "you could throw a baseball from his yard to the school."119  
 In a confusing defense of the Lomax decision, school board chairman Paul 
Nussbaum said the denial was based "on the grounds that the family requested the 
transfer in order to have the child attend an 'integrated' school,'" and that granting the 
transfer "would in effect acknowledge the existence of two types of school systems, 
                                                






namely a segregated system and an integrated system."120 Nussbaum's remarks reveal 
the board's intentional circumventing of the law in perpetuating segregation in county 
schools. The responses of school officials further reveal the school board's 
willingness to compromise the fundamental spirit of school desegregation efforts. In 
his argument, Lomax testified he was aware that county school buses, in order to 
sustain segregation, were carrying black children great distances from their 
communities to segregated schools, passing segregated white schools along the way. 
Lomax also showed photographs of the deteriorating conditions at Lakeland 
Elementary, calling the school "an eyesore."121 The Lomax family consistently stated 
their interest in having their child educated in an integrated environment, yet it is 
interesting to note that Councilman Lomax used the photographs to justify 
transferring his son, not to argue for improvements at the Lakeland school on behalf 
of his elected constituents.  
 Close-knit and resilient, most Lakeland families did not pursue freedom-of-
choice transfers for their children. Benay Gray Hawkins was the same age as the 
Lomax child and decades later reflected on her perceptions of the community's 
reaction to those events: "I can't say why the [Lomax] family did it. I can't say why all 
the families didn't go in and do it. … I can remember there was talk, and it was more 
about them thinking they were better than the rest of us, but it wasn't like we stopped 









what we were doing," Hawkins says.122 Lakeland resident Maxine Gross remembers 
that at least two other Lakeland families also received freedom-of-choice transfers. 
Gross, several years younger than the Lomax child and Hawkins, was not yet in 
school in 1961. While researching Lakeland's history in 2008 for a book project, she 
spoke with members of the Lomax family, whom she says saw the choice policy as an 
opportunity: "They thought the facilities and everything were better and that they 
should be able to get that. And so that's why they fought for his entry into the school." 
Gross said she asked her father why, when she and her twin sister started school, he 
had not pursued a freedom-of-choice transfer to a nearby white school. "He said he 
felt it more important to support Lakeland Elementary School in getting the resources 
that the kids needed right here in the community," Gross recalled.123 Blacks' common 
interest in securing their children's well being did not presume they were unified in 
their perceptions of the benefits of desegregation. 
 On October 7, the Baltimore Afro-American reported that the Lomax child had 
integrated College Park Elementary on Monday, October 2, within a mile of his 
Lakeland neighborhood. The family had been granted a hearing before the state board 
of education in mid-August. There, NAACP attorney Juanita Mitchell pointed out 
that white attendance zones and negro attendance zones were marked on school 
district maps, and she accused the county of  "deliberately gerrymandering and 
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redistricting the schools to perpetuate segregation."124 Mitchell argued that school 
district leaders had "the entire eighth grade in Lakeland Junior High transfer to the 
Fairmount [sic] Heights Junior High School although the children had to pass an all-
white junior high school” along the way.125  
 Defending the freedom-of-choice policy, Schmidt testified that 465 out of 
8,100 black children were enrolled in formerly white schools.126 The hearing became 
"stormy" and ended with Schmidt consenting to allow the Lomax child to desegregate 
College Park Elementary. The state board did not rule on the case.127  
 By early 1962, the Lakeland delegation that had addressed the board on the 
Bethune question the previous summer had joined with blacks from other parts of the 
county to form Prince George's Citizens Education Committee. On January 9, 1962, 
after trying for two months to schedule a hearing with the school board, Jesse J. Warr 
of the North Englewood community led a delegation of black parents to that evening's 
board meeting, and the Rev. Perry Smith of North Brentwood, who had replaced 
Hester King as the local NAACP president, also accompanied a group to the 
meeting.128  
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 On November 24, 1961, Warr had submitted to the members of the board of 
education a petition he declared to be signed by "more than five hundred citizens of 
this county."129 At the January session, he reminded the school board members that 
his group had addressed them on the same issue three times in 1961 and had 
exchanged written correspondence with individual board members over the past six 
months. He asked the body to clarify its current desegregation policies and to provide 
specifics of its plan to render more desegregation in the county schools. Warr posed 
direct questions from several pages of questions he said had been unanswered in the 
written correspondence. Without waiting for responses from board members, he 
stated his delegation's views on the subject: 
 "Are students in the county's public schools assigned to schools on the basis 
of race?" Warr asked. Speaking for the delegation, he said, "We submit the answer is 
yes." He then asked, "Is Prince George's County, in fact, maintaining dual school 
systems?" He replied, "We believe the answer is yes." Warr asked that the community 
be given, "today, the Board's official answer" to requests made in the petition, and 
that the board "adopt a plan to bring the school system … into full compliance with 
constitutional requirements by September 1962." Asserting what the petitioners 
believed to be their lawful claim to education equality, Warr advised the board of the 
group's intent to appeal to the state board of education and also to take legal action, if 
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necessary.130 For these parents, the desegregation of schools was a paramount issue in 
their private and civic lives. Their civic engagement was directly related to their 
children and their schools. Even in understanding desegregation to be a matter of law, 
they did not take it for granted but instead lobbied for it, interpreting it as an edict that 
would not only advantage their children but also advance their race.  
 Responding to Warr's testimony, the school board noted that since 1955 when 
the freedom-of-choice policy went into effect, 581 of the 675 applications submitted 
had been approved. Board chairman Carroll W. Beatty boasted, "The schools of 
Prince George's County are now in full compliance with the Supreme Court decision 
of 1954."131 Warr countered that if a child did not apply for a free-choice transfer, the 
child would be assigned to a school based on her or his race. Attempting to justify 
segregation, board member Thomas F. Hicks said forcing children to go to the school 
nearest their neighborhood was "not the American way," an opinion that ten years 
later would contradict the rhetoric of anti-busing white parents trying to keep their 
children enrolled in their neighborhood schools.132  
 However, in 1964, two years after the black parents petitioned the school 
board, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed federal legislation that established a new 
American way, one that required school boards throughout the country to draw 
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attendance zones that would place more black and white children in the same schools 




Chapter 5: Aiming for Quality 
 
When the federal government enacted in 1964 a law requiring the nation's public 
schools to move decisively toward the full implementation of desegregation or face 
funding sanctions, civil rights and socially progressive organizations throughout 
Prince George's County, with black and white members, pressured the board of 
education to accelerate its desegregation planning. Going further, they challenged 
them to pursue a principled approach, not one driven by the avoidance of sanctions. 
Stepping in to provide oversight and technical assistance to the slow-moving board, 
the federal Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1968 proposed its own 
plan for desegregating the county's schools. In doing so, the government became 
seemingly complicit in subjugating the interests of black county residents. In 
response, blacks made their priorities clear, among them: high-quality education for 
their children whether in segregated or desegregated schools and quality schools in 
their own communities. 
 
 In the 1963-64 school year, ten years after Brown, 1,225 of the county's 
10,209 black students were enrolled in schools with white students, by way of 
freedom-of-choice transfers and residential attendance zones. The remaining 8,984 
black children attended the nineteen county schools that had all-black enrollments.133 
That number was down from twenty-four all-black schools in 1954. When President 
Lyndon B. Johnson in 1964 signed the Civil Rights Act, it outlawed racial 
                                                




discrimination by any organization that was receiving federal funding. The legislation 
also authorized the federal government to withhold federal monies to school districts 
that had not yet desegregated, forcing Prince George's County to negotiate with the 
United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, one of the federal 
agencies responsible for enforcing Title VI, for the time needed to develop an 
acceptable desegregation plan and secure its annual education allotment from the 
government.  
 Granting the federal government oversight of the nation's schools would, 
some believed, bring "a quick and painless end to racial segregation in public 
schools," historian Hall argues. In reality, Title VI was "foisted on an unwitting 
public by a 'liberal elite' made up of judges, government officials, and bureaucrats," 
Hall posits, and in the long run, it only forced black Americans to bear "the onus of 
their own failure or success."134  
  
 On the nation's civil rights agenda, the movement to desegregate schools was 
as galvanizing an issue as were voting, access to public accommodations, and fair 
housing. At 485 square miles, Prince George's County's pro-desegregation advocates 
were dispersed enough to ensure that someone in every area of the county throughout 
the 1960s and 1970s was instigating to bring about the fair and equitable 
desegregation of county schools. The Prince George's County Action Project, for 
example, comprised more than forty organizations with diverse purposes. Its 
members included the Prince George's Fair Housing Coalition, Congress of Racial 
                                                




Equality, Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, churches, interfaith 
organizations, municipalities, civic associations, and local government offices. The 
local NAACP and the Congress of Racial Equality were expectedly active, but so 
were the Council of Parent-Teacher Associations and the League of Women Voters, 
both under the leadership of white New York native Ruth S. Wolf. The League was 
noticeably out front in petitioning county policy makers to adopt fair housing 
policies. Wolf's community mindedness led to her appointment to the county school 
board in 1967, where with black board member Jesse Warr she staunchly challenged 
the board's anti-desegregation majority.135  
 The U.S. Civil Rights Commission also cited Clergy for Peaceful 
Desegregation, an interracial and interdenominational group comprising 150 Prince 
George's County ministers, for putting forth an “unprecedented effort" to "improve 
race relations" in schools and communities after the 1972 busing decision.136 
 Terrell Wertz was perhaps one of the more daring white advocates for 
desegregation. The mayor of Cheverly, Wertz went against most of his 7,000 
constituents and urged parents to support the school district's desegregation plan. In 
the December 1969 edition of the town's newsletter, Wertz appealed to his 
constituents to get behind the planned transfer of Cheverly students to the 
traditionally black Bethune Junior High School and Fairmont Heights High. Saying it 
was best to be prepared for the September 1970 change, Wertz told residents, "All of 
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our efforts as adults should be directed toward creating the proper atmosphere as the 
thing goes into effect."137  
 On May 9, 1965, the Prince George's County Action Project's Committee on 
Education sent a report to the school board detailing the board's failure "to exhaust all 
means to fully implement desegregation of schools." The committee further criticized 
the freedom-of-choice system, saying it "causes and forces … both Negroes and 
whites to accept unequal and separate schools." It advised the board to make a "good 
faith start" toward implementing a desegregation plan and presented a list of steps to 
take, among them: "If assigning a student outside of his residential area perpetuates 
segregation, move the child."138 The advice was purposely sarcastic in its simplicity, 
as white school boards around the country were taking extreme, ridiculous, and 
wasteful measures to keep white children in all-white schools located in all-white 
areas. 
 With the stipulations of Title VI requiring more desegregation than the school 
system had accomplished in the eleven years since Brown, and the receipt of federal 
education funds contingent upon an acceptable plan, the school board on June 22, 
1965, voted on an "accelerated" plan for desegregating county schools.139 They set 
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aside a plan Superintendent Schmidt had proposed on June 8, which activist Michael 
Tabor of the County Action Project, as well as members of the Congress of Racial 
Equality, had pointed out would still leave 7,000 of the county's 11,200 black school 
children in sixteen segregated schools in 1965-66.140 In the school year that had just 
ended, 1964-65, eighteen schools had operated with all-black enrollments. Of the 11, 
284 black students enrolled in the school system, 9,017 had been assigned to all-black 
schools.141  
 At that June 22 school board meeting, J. Franklyn Bourne of the county 
NAACP urged board members to "go beyond legal requirements," be less constrained 
by convention, and devise a policy driven more by principle than a need to secure 
federal funding.142 The central component of the board's plan did go further – 
although it was not enough – by establishing single attendance zones that would 
require black and white students to attend the schools closest to their neighborhoods. 
The plan committed the board to "serve all children in proximity to the school" and to 
do so "without regard to race."143  
 At a crowded July 28, 1965, school board meeting, a white parent appealed 
for parents' "prerogative to get out" of an attendance zone "if he feels for any reason 
he does not like the district he is in." Other white parents were concerned "the abrupt 
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change" would "lower educational levels" at their children's schools.144 When Bourne 
began reading an NAACP statement endorsing the new plan, white parents walked 
out of the meeting, while a spokesperson for the County Action Project 
acknowledged the board's relative progress, thanked board members for the decision, 
and encouraged them to continue educating the public on the progress of 
desegregation.145  
 That November, a Prince George’s County NAACP officer told the members 
of the county school board that black people viewed their support of desegregation as 
a moral responsibility,146 a way to "insure the sum total good life for our citizens, in 
regards to all areas which includes, health, housing, recreation, as well as 
education."147 He testified that the black citizens of the county were calling upon their 
school district leaders to be "clear-sighted" in helping black students "establish the 
conditions of [their] own dignity … and recognize the dignity and value of others."148 
Further, he reminded the school board of its obligation to ensure the general well 
being of all children, underscoring "that every school in Prince George's County 
                                                
144. Richard Homan, "Desegregation Plan Angers Parents in Prince George's," 




146. Gretta Gordy Henry, "A Descriptive Study of the Human Relations Activities 
and the Process of Desegregation in the Prince George's County, Maryland, Public 
Schools, 1965-1973, Ph.D. Dissertation, George Washington University, 1974. 
 
147. "NAACP Statement to the Board of Education" (November 19, 1968), Box 7, 
Folder 1, Ruth S. Wolf Papers, Special Collections, University of Maryland Libraries. 
 




should have white and black children … rather than [be] entirely segregated in either 
direction."149  
 Nonetheless, the pattern of willful irresponsibility continued on the part of the 
superintendent and the school board, as the 1965-66 school year operated with ten 
schools enrolling only black students, who made up more than half the total black 
students enrolled in the system. Over the next two school years, 1966-1967 and 1967-
68, the only change to this pattern was that black enrollment at four of the schools 
dropped below one hundred percent, though it remained between ninety and ninety-
nine. 
  
 With Governor Marvin Mandel's March 1968 appointment of a black citizen, 
Jesse J. Warr, to the county school board, residents had evidence of some change 
taking place. Warr was the county NAACP's legislative chairman. He replaced 
Doswell Brooks, the former Supervisor of Colored Education who had died a month 
earlier. Like Brooks and Mandel, Warr was a Republican. Civil-rights minded, 
devoutly religious, and non-militant, the Tennessee native was married and had 
children enrolled in the county school system. He lived on the same block as 
Fairmont Heights High School. In a few years, when the 1972 court battle over 
busing was settled, Warr would be unanimously elected school board chairman.  
 Upon his appointment, however, he joined a school board whose majority of 
members were as complacent with the status of desegregation as was the 






superintendent.150 One month after Warr's appointment, on April 4, Martin Luther 
King Jr., was assassinated, angering and further propelling blacks nationwide to fight 
against the withholding of their right to equal educational opportunities. Three 
months later, the regional Office of Civil Rights for HEW began bearing down on the 
school board to desegregate five schools that still had all-black enrollments.151 On 
July 25, 1968, following a three-day, onsite evaluation of the school system to 
measure its desegregation readiness for the 1968-69 school year, Mr. Mamarella, an 
HEW official, conducted a tense meeting with Superintendent Schmidt.  
 The anticipated total black-student enrollment for the upcoming year was 
22,285. Although the year would open with only five all-black schools, four other 
schools still had enrollments that were at least eighty-nine percent black.152 These 
nine schools were Fairmont Heights High, Bethune Junior High, and Beaver Heights, 
Fairmount Heights, Glenarden Woods, Highland Park, Lakeland, North Brentwood, 
and Oakwood elementary schools.153   
 Exasperated with HEW's negative assessment of the school system's progress 
on desegregation, Schmidt gave the impression he had understood neither the 
compulsory nature nor the complexity of the Brown mandate.  
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 "This county took on a massive problem of selling the public on geographical 
boundaries," Schmidt told Mamarella. "People were [t]old that the neighborhood 
school concept would be the end of the desegregation problems. Now you are saying 
that is not enough."154 
 Mamarella suggested the county close its one remaining all-black high school, 
Fairmont Heights, and the one all-black junior high school, Mary McLeod Bethune. 
"This would solve your problem," he told Schmidt.  
 The superintendent asked, "Is the department saying to us, 'You cannot have 
any Negro schools,' and that you will apply this same rule to all the major cities for 
the United States or just Prince George's County?"  
 Mamarella told Schmidt that the goal of Brown was to break down legal 
segregation in schools in the South.  
 "What if the people don't want the plan?" Schmidt asked.  
 "If the people don't want to follow the law of the land, they are wrong," 
Mamarella replied.155  
 Whether Schmidt's concerns were grounded in empathy for his constituents, 
his own opposition to desegregation, or an aversion to controversy, his exchange with 
Mamarella signaled the indifference with which he would continue to oversee the 
county's desegregation process.  
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 Following up on its July promise to provide detailed technical assistance to 
the county, HEW on August 27, 1968, delivered Schmidt a recommended plan for 
closing by June 1969 four of the five remaining all-black schools: Fairmont Heights 
High, Mary McLeod Bethune Junior High, and Lakeland and North Brentwood 
elementary schools. Glenarden Woods Elementary would remain open and be paired 
with a nearby white school, Dodge Park Elementary, although there was no road or 
path that connected the two schools.156 However, since the July meeting, HEW had 
added Oakcrest Elementary to the list of recommended closings. This plan also 
directed the county to ensure three other all-black elementary schools, Beaver 
Heights, Fairmont Heights Elementary, and Highland Park maintained a fifty percent 
white enrollment. Further, these schools were to provide remedial instruction in core 
subjects; increase instruction in music, art, and "other cultural areas"; use "innovative 
techniques" to "lift the quality of instruction;"157 and maintain a faculty that was fifty 
percent black and fifty percent white.158  
 After discussing the HEW plan at its October 8 meeting, the school board on 
October 29 directed Schmidt to disseminate the plan to the press and public, including 
PTA and civic leaders whose constituents would be affected by the changes. Upon 
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learning of the proposal, black parent Sylvester Vaughns said HEW and the county 
school board were pulling a "hoax on the black community by having us believe for 
the last 14 years that we were moving toward full equality.'"159  
 The board's next step was to invite the community at large to a public meeting 
"for the purpose of hearing citizen comments or ideas on how desegregation might be 
achieved."160 The notification went out on November 6, but on November 7, 
Superintendent Schmidt received a letter from HEW informing him that the agency 
was withdrawing the plan because it was based upon obsolete information and data. 
HEW advised Schmidt to move forward with soliciting community input and 
suggested the county propose its own desegregation plan by December 31. To 
"correct the number of false rumors and the rising apprehension and concern of 
parents," Schmidt's office informed the media that HEW had withdrawn the plan.161   
 On the evening of November 19, 400 citizens, about 300 of them black,162 
accepted the board's invitation and came to voice their concerns about the proposed 
school closings. "Few speakers supported integration as an end in itself," Carl Sims 
reported the next day in the Washington Post. Clear about their expectations, 
however, black speakers said their "primary concern was quality of education." 
                                                










Decisively, they conveyed that "integration was seen as a desirable, but not a 
necessary, corollary to it."163 
 The spokesperson for the combined civic associations of Chapel Oaks, 
Fairmont Park, and North Englewood – where Fairmont Heights High and Bethune 
Junior High were located – addressed the board's failure to transfer white students 
from the overcrowded Bladensburg and Central high schools, both with majority-
white populations, to the under-capacity, all-black Fairmont Heights, which enrolled 
900 students but "could accommodate more than 1,300 students." The associations 
also pressed the board to integrate its own offices "by demonstrating a more fair 
placement of blacks on the supervisory and clerical levels."164  
A representative for the county NAACP also addressed the board that 
evening. Monroe Williamson, chairman of the association's education subcommittee, 
said its members were "striving to make Prince George's County the best area in 
which to raise [their] families" and proposed that, "rather than busing black children 
only into former white schools," the board initiate "the concept of dual busing."  
Williamson addressed academic matters, as well, asking the board to update 
the school district's social studies and history curricula. He testified that the teaching 
resources portrayed racist representations and argued that the textbooks were 
"completely biased, with stereotyped tendencies." Williamson stressed that the 
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curriculum's materials did not "adequately meet the needs of the student in 
understanding and/or coping with the complexities of social change." He also asked 
the board to "make every effort to remove the word 'token' as in 'token integration,' 
from the vernacular."165 
The PTA representative for Beaver Heights Elementary, Isaac Cook, read a 
statement the parents had drafted at a call-meeting after receiving notice of the public 
hearing. They criticized the school board's failure to rezone white children to schools 
in black neighborhoods and articulated the standard they had set for their school. 
Cook told the board that it should take "any steps, necessary" to develop Beaver 
Heights into "a model school, a school which any student of the county should want 
to attend."166  
 In front of the school board and their white neighbors, the black parents at this 
meeting delivered a message that race theorist Derrick Bell would some thirty-five 
years later reiterate, that families, "regardless of race, seek schools providing high-
quality education in a setting with shared community values, safety, proximity, and 
respect for parents."167 
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Chapter 6: The Typical Suburb 
 
Through neighborhood issues focused on engaging and revitalizing black 
neighborhoods, and with the guidance of community empowerment organization, 
residents of some Prince George's neighborhoods learned to advocate for their own 
interests. Rejecting an HEW desegregation proposal that was as demoralizing as the 
school district's own plans had been, black residents were presented with an 
experimental curriculum for the all-black Fairmont Heights High School, developed 
and proposed by several progressive educators from Harvard University. The 
constant preparation of new proposals demonstrated that the local black community 
was active in the desegregation process. Its objections impacted decision making, but 
most of the district's proposals still failed to grasp how deeply the black community 
was committed to the schools in their own neighborhoods, and to recognize the 
vitality of those schools. 
 Responding to the black community's strong opposition to closing the five 
county schools that still were operating with all-black or at least ninety-percent black 
enrollments, HEW proposed a revised plan in April 1969. The most extreme 
recommendation in the revised proposal involved discontinuing the high school 
program at Fairmont Heights in the 1970-71 school year and moving the Mary 
McLeod Bethune Junior High across the street into the larger, former high school 
building, enabling more desegregation at Bethune.  
 The 928 students, all black, enrolled at Fairmont Heights High would be 




predominantly white high schools – Bladensburg High, less than two miles north of 
Fairmont Heights, and Central High, about the same distance to the south. Largo 
High, a new school, was under construction and would absorb some of the relocated 
Fairmont Heights students, thus alleviating the overcrowding at Bladensburg and 
Central.  
 The HEW proposal would move some white children from Bladensburg 
Junior High to the relocated Bethune Junior High, enabling the county for the first 
time to accomplish two-way busing – black and white students transported 
deliberately to achieve integration, which several black civic associations had called 
for in 1968. The vacated Bethune Junior High building could be used as "a model 
learning center for children confined to an all-Negro neighborhood and segregated 
education," HEW suggested.168  
 For all its effort and purposeful planning, HEW had discounted the 
community's desire to keep Fairmont Heights High operating as a senior high school. 
Only five months earlier the NAACP and other groups had "unequivocally 
opposed"169 closing Fairmont Heights High, opposition that HEW carelessly 
interpreted as allegiance only to the physical structure. In a statement sent to the press 
on April 12, 1969, U.S. Congressman Lawrence J. Hogan of Maryland accused HEW 
of being "totally aloof from Prince George's school problem." Superintendent 
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Schmidt said some of the residents who had telephoned his office about HEW's April 
proposal were Fairmont Heights High graduates who opposed "leaving the 
community without a high school."170 
 The school board rejected the plan. Although HEW was aligned with blacks 
on the general principle that school desegregation would equalize educational 
opportunities, HEW agents working throughout the South developed a reputation for 
leaving black schools, students, teachers, administrators, and communities feeling 
abandoned. Recounting the closing of the all-black E.E. Butler High School in 
Gainesville, Georgia, in 1969, a former student said it was "nearly a century of black 
education that got slammed shut."171 Some Gainesville residents blamed the closing 
on the lack of determined black leadership. Educator Winfred Pitts, who later 
researched the closing and its impact on the black people of Gainesville, observed: 
"Although HEW did not order that Butler be closed, the department did approve the 
board's plan that included the school's closure." Pitts concluded that the desires of the 
African-American community "were largely ignored by the board and HEW."172  
  
 The late 1960s in Prince George's County also saw a swell of activism around 
the governance of county schools. Tired of the seemingly secret way school board 
members were appointed, with influential Democrats and Republicans forwarding the 
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names of favored party members to the governor, the county NAACP joined fifty-one 
other organizations, comprising black and white members, to lobby for procedural 
changes in the nomination of school board members. At the first School Board 
Nominating Convention, thirty PTAs, thirteen civic associations, "church 
organizations, and the NAACP submitted their own nominees to fill an upcoming 
vacancy on the school board. The NAACP nominated Theresa D. Banks, a black 
community activist and highly regarded educator who had taught in the county's 
Colored Schools system and still was teaching. The county PTA's nominee, Joanne 
Goldsmith, a white Democrat, won the nomination and assumed the school board 
position the following year.173  
 Activism was pivotal to keeping black-community interests before policy 
makers and enforcement agencies such as HEW. Between 1968 and 1969, there were 
at least six Washington Post reporters covering school desegregation in Prince 
George's County.174 Black municipalities, civic associations, and the NAACP were 
augmented by groups such as the Prince George's Black Action Committee, whose 
purpose was "to invade the establishment" and help citizens get answers to "questions 
on zoning, tax assessments, municipal services, annexation, and fair housing."175 
Community leadership and activism during the period also were being fostered within 
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the federally funded Model Cities program, a component of President Lyndon 
Johnson's endeavor to assist communities in developing economically and 
structurally. In Prince George's County, the Model Cities program focused on 
revitalizing a number of neighborhoods east and north of where the county intersected 
Washington, D.C., a segment of suburbia representative of the "contiguous spillover" 
from major urban areas in the 1970s.176 The target area for revitalization included the 
town of Fairmount Heights and its cluster of several neighboring black communities. 
Model Cities staff worked to ensure blacks living outside of the county's incorporated 
communities had as much a voice in county affairs as residents living within the 
incorporated neighborhoods, where mayors and town councils wielded influence with 
county and state legislators.177  
 Black residents' civic engagement was evident and being noticed. In a 
November 1968 Washington Post article, reporter Carl Sims declared that "Prince 
George's may well serve as the first testing ground for black activism in Washington's 
black suburbs." Sims suggested that "perhaps more than a drive for black power and 
integration as such, the distinguishing characteristic in Prince George's is a typically 
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suburban – and middle class – interest in the quality of educational programs, master 
plans, zoning controls, libraries and sidewalks."178  
 The county's leaders should have taken heed. Blacks in Prince George's 
County were civic minded, expected their taxes to provide the same services white 
taxpayers received, and were more and more willing to confront county leaders with 
these expectations.  
  
 In July 1968, two months after receiving and rejecting HEW's drastic April 
desegregation proposal, Superintendent Schmidt, with approval of the school board, 
submitted an entirely new – and experimental – proposal. With $12 million in federal 
funding at risk if the district continued operating Fairmont Heights as a segregated 
school and drawing its enrollment only from the surrounding black communities, 
Schmidt and the board still could not commit to drawing a plan that would decisively 
assign white children to Fairmont Heights High.  
 The board's proposal for accomplishing desegregation was the adoption of an 
experimental program described broadly as "enriched" and "new and innovative." 
Called the Model Urban Cooperative High School and packaged with the Model 
Neighborhoods Initiative, the program would render a complete curriculum change at 
Fairmont Heights.179 More significantly for Schmidt, its "strengthened" curriculum 
                                                
 
178. Sims, "Negroes Build Strength in Prince George's"; Lawrence Meyer, "County 
Delays Fairmont High Action," Washington Post, June 25, 1969. 
 
179. Lawrence Feinberg, "Fairmont Begins to Find Black Is Beautiful," Washington 




would possibly entice white students from Bladensburg High to enroll at Fairmont 
Heights in an open registration arrangement, enabling the county to finally 
desegregate Fairmont Heights.180 The program was developed and proposed by a 
team of Boston-area educators, including two former students of Harvard University's 
graduate school of education.  
 In a meeting with HEW two months earlier, Superintendent Schmidt and 
Model Cities staff, in a rare instance of agreement, had endorsed the Harvard plan. 
Schmidt did so in acquiescence to residents' desire to keep the school open, and also 
to counter HEW's proposal to close it. HEW was nonetheless reticent to endorse it 
and warned the school district not to rely on its approval, saying "it was doubtful the 
agency would consider an experiment at Fairmont Heights to be tantamount to 
desegregation."181 Still, Schmidt went ahead and submitted the Harvard initiative as 
the district's counterproposal to HEW's April proposal, and also as the key strategy 
for accomplishing integration at Fairmont Heights High in the 1970-71 school year.  
 A month before he sent the experimental initiative to HEW for approval, 
Superintendent Schmidt had informed Fairmont Heights High teachers, staff, and 
students of the Harvard initiative in a schoolwide meeting. The faculty criticized 
Schmidt and the three school board members who were present at the June 23 
meeting for moving ahead and adopting the Harvard plan, including hiring a 
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principal, without having further involved them in the discussions. The model 
program would require a complete curriculum change, one that the Harvard group 
had written and would oversee. Fairmont Heights social studies teacher Myrtle 
Fentress accused Schmidt of marginalizing and exploiting the all-black staff: "You're 
so against the times," Fentress told Schmidt. "This isn't what we need or want. This is 
another instance of outsiders telling Negroes what they need. I think the only 
difference this time is that our carpetbaggers came with briefcases."182  
 Three months later, when the 1968-69 school year opened, the three-man 
Harvard team began promoting and developing the Model Urban Cooperative 
curriculum they would implement in September 1969, a year away. Still doubtful the 
experimental initiative would actually lure white students, HEW directed the school 
district to heavily promote the Harvard program within the white communities near 
Fairmont Heights.183 The Harvard team – Alvin Fortune, who would take over as 
Fairmont Heights principal, and two administrative planners – prepared to implement 
their program at Fairmont Heights High the next year.  
 The experimental program did not have the sincere endorsement of 
Superintendent Schmidt, who averted every attempt to assign white students to 
Fairmont Heights High and now endorsed the Harvard initiative only to secure the 
school district's federal subsidy. HEW officials viewed the model urban school 
initiative as a passive, hit-or-miss desegregation strategy  
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 In February 1970, new attendance boundary maps drawn by administrative 
planning staff showed that white students in Cheverly had been zoned to attend 
Fairmont Heights the next September. The school board had habitually failed to 
activate the maps its planners had designed. Determined it would not overtly and 
administratively desegregate Fairmont Heights High, the board had decided to adopt 
the Harvard plan as a way to enable desegregation but not require it. However, as 
negotiations with HEW now made it necessary, the desegregation of Fairmont 
Heights based on the redrawn maps would go forward. The new boundary maps 
would see 536 white and 99 black students from Bladensburg High transferred to 
Fairmont Heights High,184 and 217 black students from Fairmont Heights High185 
moved to the predominantly white Central High. Fairmont Heights' neighbor, 
Bethune Junior High, which the county had allowed to remain all-black since its 
opening in 1962, also would be desegregated for the first time when the 1970-71 
school year started, with 273 white children transferring there from Bladensburg 
Junior High, and 209 white children and 39 black from Kentland Junior High.186 
 After months of volleying between county school officials and HEW, only 
one of the five schools HEW had in August 1968 recommended closing, North 
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Brentwood Elementary, would be closed. It operated through the 1969-70 school 
year.187 
  
                                                




Chapter 7: Too Long, Discrimination   
From both the pro-desegregation and anti-desegregation perspectives, the federal 
government's role in desegregating the nation's schools frequently felt as much like 
imposition as enforcement. Throughout the 1970s, negotiations between the county 
school board and the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare regarding 
the planned closings of several black elementary schools, along with the initiation of 
a federally funded urban renewal program in the Lakeland community, created 
disillusion, frustration, and, eventually, feelings of irreparable loss among some 
black county residents. 
  
 In March 1969, Dervey Lomax of Lakeland, a black community located 
within the municipal boundaries of College Park, was once again testifying before the 
county board of education on a school desegregation issue. Eight years earlier, Lomax 
had contested the school board's denial of his request to transfer his young son to a 
nearby white school, under the school district's freedom-of-choice desegregation 
policy. He had taken his plea to the state board of education and won a concession to 
allow his child to integrate College Park Elementary School. This time, Lomax was 
among about one hundred people, including fellow Lakelanders and residents of 
Berwyn Heights and College Park, neighboring white communities. The group was 
debating proposals for eliminating segregation in the elementary schools located 
within those communities – Lakeland, Berwyn Heights, and College Park. HEW had 
already recommended closing Lakeland, but the school board was considering two 
other possible plans for the three schools: closing Lakeland and busing the 




College Park, the schools where Lomax had not been permitted to enroll his son in 
1961; or constructing a new school in the Lakeland community, one that would 
accommodate the children at Berwyn Heights Elementary and College Park 
Elementary – and also achieve integration. 
 While some whites preferred having Lakeland children bused into their 
communities, others, including College Park Mayor William Gullett, "stressed that 
the largely Black community had been discriminated against for too long" and 
opposed actions that would render more harm, including dividing Lakeland children 
between two schools.188 The story of Lakeland Elementary was part of a larger 
narrative that involved even greater loss, and trauma, for residents of the sixty-seven-
year-old black community. Beginning in the 1960s, federal urban renewal funds that 
Lakeland residents were told would be used for housing upgrades, flood control 
engineering, and other infrastructure projects within their community were redirected 
elsewhere. As a result, "a large proportion of the HUD funds was spent improving 
parts of College Park outside of the urban renewal area" while destroying much of 
Lakeland.189 "From the 1960s through the mid-1980s, the urban renewal project in 
Lakeland demolished many family homes, displaced 104 of 150 households, and 
replaced much of the neighborhood with a mix of subsidized townhouses, high-
density apartments largely inhabited by students, and an elder housing facility," 
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according to the Lakeland Community Heritage Project, an organization dedicated to 
preserving the town's history and memory.190  
  At public hearings, persistent Lakeland residents, organized as the Project 
Area Committee, had firmly debated with mayor St. Clair Reeves and developer Leon 
Weiner.191 Weiner had presented a redevelopment plan that included two seven-story 
apartment complexes, one for senior citizens and the other for University of Maryland 
faculty and staff, as well as forty units of federally subsidized townhouses, twenty-six 
single-family town homes, and seven single-family homes. In an August 11, 1977, 
Agnes Gross, a Lakeland resident for more than fifty years, questioned why only six 
new single-family homes had been built. "To say we couldn't buy them, or afford it, 
should be left up to us to decide whether we can or cannot." meeting, Lakeland 
resident Samuel Hollomand pressed city and project officials on the question of 
displaced Lakelanders. "They would like to move back to Lakeland. Why aren't they 
consulted?" Hollomand inquired. His wife, Mary, asked why all the plans presented 
that evening were "for others, for outsiders. Where is the development for us?"192  
 Weiner, the developer, told a reporter, "That land has been paid for by all the 
people in College Park. They have some notion that all the land belongs to them. It 
doesn't."193   
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 Personal documents from the period reveal the sense of loss and 
powerlessness among Lakelanders as they faced the probable closing of the 
community school. Humanities scholar JoAnne Braxton, a Lakeland native, reflected 
in a 1998 essay on the ways "resistance emerged"194 in the notes some Lakeland 
residents kept during the painful transformation of their community. Braxton's brother 
Billy Weems recorded, typed, and distributed to his neighbors notes from Project 
Area Committee meetings. He also kept personal notes, such as this one:  
"What's really happening is that the heart of Lakeland has been removed. 
(School transplant.)." Lakeland has low enrollment … qualified teachers, 
cafeteria-gym-auditorium combined, limited traffic and spacious playgrounds. 
It would be more sensible to lighten the load than create more load to the 
overloaded. It would be cheaper (tax wise) to bring 2 or 3 busses in than it 
would be 6 or 7 buses out. After all, a parent should have something to say 
about the educating process of his child."195  
  
 With the school board having reversed its initial recommendation to close 
Lakeland Elementary, it endorsed the option proposed in March 1969, to keep 
Lakeland operating until 1972, when children from both Lakeland and Berwyn 
Heights elementary schools would be relocated to an all-new school to be built in 
Lakeland. Children from College Park Elementary would not be transferred to the 
new school.  
 Plans for construction of the school involved the county's expropriation of 
several of Lakeland's older homes and, thus, the displacement of those families. The 
childhood home of Robert R. Gray was among the Lakeland properties the county 
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would be claiming. Gray had been principal of the Fairmount Heights Elementary 
School since its opening in 1934, and he lived with his wife in the town of Fairmount 
Heights, where he also was mayor. Three of his older siblings, all over sixty years of 
age, still shared the family home. Gray's correspondence with county officials in 1969 
and 1970 also conveys the despair members of the Lakeland community experienced 
as a consequence of school desegregation and urban renewal, as well as the efforts 
they made to retain personal and community integrity.  
 Gray wrote in August 1969:  "It is hard for me to explain my feelings about 
the property to you, or to anyone who has not been at my end of the rope. To think of 
losing what has been my home all of my life is one thing; but to think of being forced 
to relocate my family at this stage in its life is quite another."196  
 With the terms of releasing the property to the county settled, Gray sent 
another letter in March 1970: 
We are today … signing this proposed contract, with regrets. … Since I 
appeared before the Board, in November, we have lost one of our sisters, who 
probably felt the pressure of being forced out of the house, where she had 
lived since her early childhood. We are trying to soften the blow for the 
others. … My sincere hope is that you, nor any of those involved, nor your 
families, will ever become victims of such a transaction.197 
 
 The school that was constructed on the properties that had belonged to 
Lakeland families was named Paint Branch Elementary. The name identified the new 
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school's proximity to an Anacostia River tributary, but it in no way commemorated 
the community's significance in the education of black children throughout the county 
for nearly seventy years.  
 Members of the Lakeland community readily participated in debates about the 
fate of their local school and expressed their desire for it to continue operating for 
Lakeland children and those in the larger College Park community. The school 
board's decision to close the school and construct a new one within the neighborhood 
could not be wholly celebrated by Lakeland residents, as construction of the new 
school was only one phase of the city and state's urban renewal plan for the 
community. As the state took possession of residents' land and homes, and as their 
school was demolished, Lakeland parents and children in the 1970s experienced the 
desegregation of county schools, itself a disruptive experience, through the loss and 
emotional trauma of watching half their community disappear and many of their 





Chapter 8: Miles Apart 
The desegregation of the overwhelmingly white Bladensburg High and its neighbor, 
the all-black Fairmont Heights High, were pivotal to bringing Prince George's 
County into compliance with federal desegregation requirements. Between 1968 and 
1970, violent racial conflict at several county high schools, including Bladensburg, 
coincided with "a new nationwide crescendo in high school disturbances." Racial 
conflict among the nation's high school students was so regular an occurrence, the 
Washington Post's Eric Wentworth described the situation as "popping with an 
ominous staccato in the Washington suburbs, Kansas City, Pittsburgh, Milwaukee, 
and other communities around the country." Wentworth cited studies that revealed 
student protests to be frequently grounded in such concerns as "school authority" and 
"indifference," while a study done by the National Association of Secondary School 
Principals revealed that "black students attending integrated schools frequently 
protest … because they feel that even there they are being treated as second-class 
citizens." Yet another study Wentworth cited found "racial protest" to have been a 
factor in 132 uprisings among 348 high schools studied. Alarmed by the trend, 
Commissioner James E. Allen at the U. S. Department of Education sent a special, 
nationwide message to state-level education chiefs and secondary school principals 
urging them "to take the initiative in improving communications and meeting urgent 
student needs," Wentworth reported.198  
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The advice did not register at Bladensburg High. There, racial dissension and 
school-day disturbances combined with the principal's routine capitulation to the 
interests of white students provoked black parents and the county NAACP to appeal 
to the governor for protection of the school's black students.  
 During the same period at Fairmont Heights High, black social studies 
teacher Myrtle Fentress led her school's pushback against school district leaders 
who, anticipating the enrollment of white students and hoping to ease white parents' 
angst, approved an overhaul of the school's curriculum and the replacement of its 
principal without conferring with the faculty. Fentress exemplified the activist- and 
reform-minded public school teacher, constantly agitating for a desegregation 
process that fairly engaged black teachers and students, and also recognized the 
value and integrity of the black school.  
  
Bladensburg High School 
 In June 1968, as Wayne Curry's diplomatic tenure at Bladensburg High was 
winding down and graduation neared, white-community opposition to the increasing 
black enrollment at the school was tangible. In September, a few weeks into the new 
school year, racial tensions at Bladensburg boiled over. Both the Washington Post 
and Baltimore Sun reported consecutive days of "racial disturbances" that led to 
arrests and injuries.199 Over the next five years, the county school board continued to 
drag out the process of more broadly desegregating Prince George's County schools, 
                                                
199. Thomas Candus, "Prince George's Executive Wants to Put End to 





ignoring directives of the Supreme Court and the federal government, sparking 
contention between black and white communities, and prompting some black parents 
to sue the school system to force comprehensive desegregation.  
 In mid-September 1969, the administrators, teachers, parents, and students at 
Bladensburg High were trying to get to the bottom of a tense situation among the 
"estimated 300 to 500 black students and 2,000 whites" enrolled there.200 Saying 
David Dean, the principal, had refused their request for a  meeting to discuss adding a 
black studies course to the curriculum and including more black students in 
extracurricular activities, black student leaders led a sit-in on the morning of 
Wednesday, September 17 to call attention to their concerns. About two hundred 
black students participated in the protest. Several black parents were called in to join 
the meeting, which ended with the administration's commitment to add a black 
studies course to the curriculum and sponsor a black culture organization that would 
be open to all students.  
 Those concessions and black students' inclusion on the school's cheerleading 
squads, notwithstanding, one student was dismayed by the sense of token inclusion. "I 
feel it should be that they want to have us, not that they have to put up with us. The 
problem is that we're a minority out here." Black student leader Michelle Wilson 
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provided philosophical reasoning for the black students' actions, "Before a man can 
relate to another man, he's got to learn who is he. And this is what we want."201  
 The day after the black students' protest, about two-hundred-fifty white 
students engaged in a sit-in "to show the school administration that white students 
could 'get away' with the same things that blacks did." The action led to a police-
supervised morning standoff, with white students gathered in the school's upstairs 
cafeteria and black students in the downstairs cafeteria. By lunch time, black student 
leaders had been called in to negotiate the situation with the white protestors, and 
white leaders had been sent to speak with the black student protesters. By lunch time, 
the school was operating normally.202 The next day, although nearly half the student 
body stayed home to avoid trouble, the residual tensions – "fist fights, shouting 
matches and walkouts by both whites and blacks," as well as loitering in the hallways 
or outside the school – led Principal Dean to send students home.203 Police arrested 
fifty-nine white students for loitering outside the school for "offenses ranging from 
unlawful assembly to carrying a concealed weapon.204  
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 The previous school year also had started violently at Bladensburg and other 
county high schools, as local papers reported a spree of race-related fighting there, as 
well as at DuVal and Parkdale from September 24 through November 1, 1968.205 
  Sandra White Minor was a first-year student at Bladensburg in the fall of 
1968 and remembers that the small group of black students who arrived at the school 
that year "came in with vigilance, saying, 'They don't have enough for us.'" Among 
the issues the students advocated was a curriculum change: "We wanted black 
history," Minor says.  
 She recalls that the September 1969 incident began with black and white 
students sitting in the hallways.  
We refused to go to class. It got real stirred up because the black kids were on 
one side, and the white kids were on the other side. I don’t remember it 
getting to a full-fledged fight. I remember there were spots of fights. … It got 
so bad, and Channel 4 was there. … I went to my girlfriend's house and called 
my mother and said, 'Mr. Dean told us we had to go home. There was going to 
be a riot.'"206  
 
 A week after the incidents at the school, black parents and students from 
Bladensburg High met at the Glenarden Town Hall to address the racial issues at the 
school. Local NAACP officials engaged in three hours of testimony about 
Bladensburg's "apparent disinterest" in its black students. The assembly agreed to 
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officially ask for a more structured process of involving parents in disciplinary 
matters and to ask for the removal of Bladensburg High principal David Dean.207  
 Representatives of a group called Concerned Black Citizens also spoke to the 
audience to gain support of their effort to remove a county police detective who had 
recently fatally shot a black person fleeing pursuit in the Fairmount Heights 
community. Converging school desegregation with other race issues, the NAACP 
agreed to support that group's efforts. The very next evening at the school board 
meeting, NAACP representatives distributed a briefing to school board members, 
advising them that the chapter had sent a telegram to Governor Marvin Mandel 
requesting federal troops be sent to Prince George's "to protect Negroes from the 
county police."208 
  Within the week, NAACP officers wrote the school district officially asking 
for Principal Dean at Bladensburg to be removed because of his failure to resolve the 
racial conflicts at the school. Black school board member Jesse J. Warr, who also 
served on the NAACP executive board, said he would ask for Dean's dismissal if an 
investigation found he had violated the district's discipline guidelines."209 The 
Maryland Secretary of State, Blair Lee III, agreed to intervene on behalf of black 
parents who had reported to him that police stationed at the school were mistreating 
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their children. He asked school district administrators to remove the police from the 
school, but district leaders said they "would not commit themselves."210 Principal 
Dean, however, had the backing of the student government organization and the 
majority of the school's PTA executive board. The one black member of the executive 
board abstained from voting on the issue.211 The school board did not take up the 





                                                









Fairmont Heights High 
 When Fairmont Heights High School opened in 1950 to serve black students 
in the northern and western sections of Prince George's County, the senior high 
grades from Lakeland were moved to the new school. Their social studies teacher, 
Myrtle Fentress, moved with them. She had come to Prince George's County to teach 
not long after graduating Hampton Institute, along with "a number of other young 
teachers who weren't much older than we were," recalls Carroll S. Matthews, a 
member of Fairmont Heights High's first graduating class in 1950.213 His wife, Jean 
Gray Matthews, has her class of 1952 photo sitting in a silver frame on the piano of 
their home. In their eighties, they effortlessly remember the names of the teachers, 
principals, coaches, and classmates who helped give the school a symbolic role in 
county history.  
A 1957 Washington Post article on Fairmont Heights High described an 
American high school where the students could have been black or white: "the red-
brick building rambles over its hillside" [and] "parents run carpools … for the many 
extracurricular activities." In its first two decades, the school was led by James G. 
Gholson, "a man with quiet authority." Gholson had come to Prince George's from 
Virginia, where he worked at Hampton Institute's demonstration school. While 
principal at Fairmont Heights, he lived in the community with his wife and three 
children. In the 1956-57 school year, Gholson oversaw an enrollment of 1,641 pupils, 
                                                




only three of whom had requested freedom-of-choice transfers in the one year that the 
policy had been in effect.214  
The Post article noted that Fairmont Heights High offered courses that ranged 
"from physics to printing; from Spanish to shorthand," as well as "four degrees: 
academic, general, commercial, and industrial to its student body, which represents a 
cross section of cultural, economic, and educational backgrounds."215 Fred Jennings 
remembers a Fairmont Heights vocational program that "was second to none." The 
curriculum offered classes in the "building trades, auto mechanics, sheet metal," 
Jennings reflected. "I learned to lay bricks there." He also remembered the teachers 
taking the students to Timonium, near Baltimore, to compete in interscholastic 
bricklaying competitions.216  
The attendance zone for Fairmont Heights included black communities that 
were so distant from the school that some students rode buses "two hours a day on 
40- or 60-mile round trips from as far away as Bowie, Laurel, or Accokeek," the Post 
reported.217 Remembering the network of neighborhoods and families at the school, 
Maxine Jennings Gray underscores the point: "It was sure enough community … 
definitely community. From Laurel to Accokeek, it was one community."218 
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 Since the 1960s, local and federal proposals to close Fairmont Heights have 
been squelched by alumni, the communities surrounding the school, and cultural 
preservationists who want the structure to remain a monument to the black 
community's committed pursuit of education during segregation, and also remain a 
symbol of community pride. HEW's 1968 proposal to close Fairmont Heights could 
not have been more indicative of policy makers' and federal agents' detachment from 
the many students and communities the school had served. A county official proposed 
in 1974 that the county stop using Fairmont Heights High for schooling and use it 
instead "for some special purpose." The idea drew opposition from community 
members who "argued against closing the last senior high school in the county 
located in a black community."219  
 After a 1980 fire caused considerable damage to parts of the school, some 
black county leaders wondered if the fire had been set by county officials to justify 
shutting down the school. Several weeks before the fire, black parents concerned 
about maintenance negligence at some predominantly black schools, including 
Fairmont Heights High, had voiced their concerns at a school board meeting.220  
 Fairmont Heights High did not close. In August 2017, a new Fairmont Heights 
High opened on a site two miles from the original school building, which still stands, 
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a positive sign for some alumni and county residents who hope it will remain as a 
historical marker of African-American life in the county.  
  
 Fairmont Heights High social studies teacher Myrtle Fentress had been an 
irrepressible muckraker for her students, colleagues, and profession since transferring 
there from Lakeland. On June 7, 1969, a few days after learning about the Harvard 
proposal for the school, Fentress wrote a three-page letter to school board member 
Ruth Wolf addressing school officials' mischaracterizations of the school: 
It has been a year of constant frustration for students and teachers as we read 
stories in the local press that have indicated that the educational experiences in 
our school are at a very low level. Words such as 'upgrading,' 'raising the 
level,' and 'strengthening the curriculum' in these stories have suggested that 
the quality of the teaching and the learning at Fairmont Heights is 
significantly below that of the other secondary schools in the County.  
Students and teachers have been taunted on occasions by their colleagues and 
peers from other schools in the County about the fate of our school. Our 
friends in the community have been given the impression that ours is a dying 
school and that our demise is imminent.221 
 
 As desegregation planning progressed, some black teachers found their union, 
Prince George's County Educators' Association, to be unsympathetic to their interests, 
prompting them in April 1970 to unify under Concerned Black Educators. The 
immediate incident that prompted black teachers' break from PGCEA was union 
members' opposition to further desegregating Fairmont Heights High in the fall of 
1970 by transferring students from Bladensburg High. While PGCEA's representative 
council had voted to support the transfer of students to Fairmont Heights plan, a 
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referendum vote of all union members resulted in a 2,168 to 1,870 vote against the 
desegregation plan.222 Writing for the black educators group on April 23, 1970, 
Joseph Parker, himself a graduate of the county school system and an elementary 
principal in the school district, said the established union had not been "responsive to 
the needs of black people" and that it should be addressing issues that specifically 
related to black employees, such as "the recruiting and placement of black teachers, 
promotional policies, the employment of black classified employees and the racial 
balance of teachers in schools."223  
 In September 1969, as administrators at the nearby Bladensburg High were 
working to resolve the school's habitual racial conflicts, Alvin V. Fortune was 
beginning his tenure as principal at Fairmont Heights High, preparing to oversee an 
experimental, "enriched curriculum" developed within the Model Urban Cooperative 
initiative.224 A writer at the Washington Post aptly conveyed the irony of the 
situations at the two schools, one tensely integrated, and the other nonchalantly 
segregated: "While white and Negro students were fighting at Bladensburg High 
School last month, students at all-Negro Fairmont Heights High, two miles away, 
were organizing support for their new black principal."225  
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 Fortune, a former high school physical education teacher in the Boston area, 
was the only black member of the Harvard team that wrote the proposal for the urban 
high school initiative. He started his job not only with the challenge of diversifying 
the formerly one-hundred percent black student body, but also with a challenge to his 
professional credentials hanging in the air. The county teachers' union had informed 
Superintendent Schmidt that Fortune did not have Maryland administrative 
certification credentials, disqualifying him to serve as principal. The union, however, 
had set aside their fight against Fortune's appointment in response to unified support 
Fairmont Heights students and teachers offered him.226 
 Still, on September 15, with Fortune already on the job, a near-unanimous 
vote by the representative council of the Prince George's County Educators' 
Association, supported by the Maryland Teachers' Association, called for his removal 
as head administrator at Fairmont Heights. The Fairmont Heights staff were divided 
over the issue, with some teachers committed to the existing academic program and 
others open to experimenting with the model urban school program.227 Two days after 
the union voted and as rumors circulated about possible protests by Fairmont Heights 
students, who supported Fortune, the Fairmont Heights staff voted among themselves, 
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unanimously deciding to avoid further disruption of the school by asking the union to 
reverse its decision and allow Fortune to remain at the school.228  
 Myrtle Fentress had questioned the decision to adopt the Harvard plan, but 
feeling marginalized by the union and frustrated with the negative portrayals of the 
school, she switched her allegiance to Fortune. Fentress argued that making an 
administrative change with the school year under way would be disruptive. Along 
with colleagues Eddyce Pope and David Sapp, fellow union representatives, Fentress 
wrote a letter to members of the Prince George's County Educators' Association 
challenging the vote of the union's Representative Assembly. Fentress, Pope, and 
Sapp said that the school's faculty had not been made aware the assembly was 
planning to act on the matter of the principal at the meeting and, moreover, that the 
Fairmont Heights staff had been left out of the negotiations regarding Fortune's future 
at the school.229 
 Fentress and her colleagues said "removing the top administrator from 
Fairmont Heights High at this time would be disastrous," and that "the education of 
the 950 students presently enrolled supersedes any action regarding the certification 
and/or selection procedure for administrative staff." Adding that they planned to 
introduce a motion to rescind the representative assembly's vote, they closed by 
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asking for their colleagues' support "in the interest of the future of the educational 
program at Fairmont Heights High School."230  
 With Fentress' advisement, the Student Organizing Committee solicited 
support for Fortune from the countywide Student Government Organization. 
Responding affirmatively to the Fairmont Heights students' request, the countywide 
SGO then wrote board member Ruth Wolf conveying their "support of the Fairmont 
Heights students in their struggle to retain a principle for whom they have a great deal 
of respect and admiration."231  
 The Fairmont Heights students understood that the Harvard program was 
being used to lure white students to the school, and they wanted to retain a sense of 
ownership and have a say in what would happen next. "The best thing that could 
happen would be if they left Fairmont Heights the way it is," a Fairmont Heights 
student told a newspaper reporter in the fall of 1969. "We have school pride. We don't 
want whites taking it over." Another student predicted that integration would bring 
dissension and that "there'd be fights all the time, every day. Nobody would go to 
school."232  
 A Fairmont Heights parent said about the plan, "Isn't this just a way of making 
the school good enough for whites, to draw them to our school? They wouldn't do this 
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just for our children."  Students and parents were defending and affirming the value of 
an all-black high school and resisting what they viewed as the imposition of white 
authority and dominance. Students had independently formed their own "student 
action committee" and secured 853 of 960 student signatures on a petition declaring 
their allegiance to the principal: "We feel that Mr. Alvin Fortune is the best thing that 
has happened to Fairmont Heights High School in a long time," the petition read. "We 
will do everything within our moral, legal rights to stop any decision removing 
him."233   
 Motivated more by Schmidt's desire to calm the anxieties of and appease his 
Cheverly neighbors than by a genuine interest in the quality of instruction at Fairmont 
Heights, the model urban school had been initiated in a half-hearted and hasty 
manner. As principal, Alvin Fortune spent the 1969-70 school year directing the 
program through its planning stages, and engaging students, parents, and the 
community in discussions on how to best develop and operate it. Despite his efforts 
and the support from students, faculty, and parents, Fortune and his team of planners 
from Harvard were informed in April 1970, toward the end of the program's first 
year, that the Prince George's County school district would not retain the program, 
nor them, in its 1970-71 budget.   
 Superintendent Schmidt blamed the decision on budget constraints. However, 
Harvard team member Todd Endo accused Schmidt of placating the white students in 
Cheverly who, because of HEW's pressure to speed up desegregation, would be 
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reassigned from Bladensburg High to Fairmont Heights High in September 1970. 
Schmidt's biased and preferential decision making was transparent. According to the 
Washington Post, Schmidt indirectly admitted that the school board had prioritized 
the academic interests of the mostly white students at Bladensburg High over the 
academic interests of the mostly black students at Fairmont Heights. While voiding 
the experimental curriculum, Schmidt and the board had promised the Bladensburg 
students that they would find when they arrived at Fairmont Heights "the same 
courses they now have."234  
 In his letter of resignation, Endo wrote, "Since the board of education lost its 
desegregation battle with HEW, the superintendent's interest in the improvement of 
education at Fairmont Heights High has waned. Since compulsory desegregation was 
forced upon him, he seems to have concluded that the creation of a model school was 
unnecessary."235 Superintendent Schmidt's negative attitude toward desegregation 
reflected that of his Cheverly neighbors. The cancellation of the program freed him 
from the pretense of endorsing it.  
 Desegregating county schools presented unexpected openings for black 
county residents, enabling the agency and empowerment of black high school 
students and forging a space for black teachers, marginalized by their professional 
union, to represent their particular interests. However, it also necessitated the 
assertive intervention of black parents and students to insist that local and state 
officials ensure the fair treatment of their children.  
                                                






Chapter 9: Integration Is Here 
With the integration of Fairmont Heights High slated to take place the following 
school year, students and parents in the fall of 1969 began anticipating, discussing, 
and preparing for changes in the culture of this school that had been the pride and 
joy of black teenagers and teachers for nearly twenty years. Among black families, a 
full spectrum of viewpoints was evident, from despair and skepticism to optimism and 
determination to make the process work.  In the neighboring, largely white 
community of Cheverly, a few white parents optimistically prepared their children to 
attend Fairmont Heights, but the majority of Cheverly parents dreaded integration 
and were looking for ways to evade sending their children to Fairmont Heights.  
The proposed transfer of white students to an all-black school complicates the 
dominant narrative of school desegregation, which portrays black students as the 
outsiders waiting to be allowed into all-white schools. In this case, black residents of 
the county refused to permit the closing of Fairmont Heights. Further, white students 
were transferred to that school, demonstrating the degree to which black Prince 
Georgians shaped the desegregation process and the outcomes. Undeterred by the 
superintendent's indifference, they directly challenged the attitudes and decisions of 
government leaders at the county, state, and federal levels. 
 
 In November 1969, early in Alvin Fortune's brief tenure at Fairmont Heights 
High, the county board of education had finally received HEW's approval of a plan 
that would integrate Fairmont Heights and Bethune Junior High, both located within 




and Cedar Heights, while they also shared a border with the predominantly white 
community of Cheverly. Under the approved plan, Fairmont Heights High would 
enroll 536 white students and 99 black students in the 1970-71 school year, all 
transfers from Bladensburg High. A little more than nine hundred Fairmont Heights 
students would be dividing between Bladensburg and Central. The rest would 
continue at Fairmont Heights.236 On November 29, within a few days of the plan's 
announcement, a forum of black parents gathered in the Fairmont Heights High 
library to discuss how the changes could affect the school.  
 Some parents worried that white students would bring to Fairmont the 
"indoctrinated" prejudices and hostility that had been on display at Bladensburg.237 A 
student suggested there could be power struggles among the white and black students: 
"I don't think they'll be discriminated against, like we may be in the same situation," 
he said. "But there is going to be trouble because this school has been here for 20 
years. Those little white kids in Cheverly think they own the world and they're going 
to come in here trying to change things."  
 A member of the Fairmont Heights bands, declaring his "whole life is music," 
anguished about going off to Central High, which did not have a band. The parent of 
a child who also was headed to Central considered the possibility that the quality of 
education would be better there than it was at Fairmont Heights. She was among "a 
significant number" who thought so. Other parents, however, contested a public 
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statement that county commissioner Gladys Spellman had made, in which she implied 
a low academic standard at Fairmont.  
 The shrinking PTA membership at Fairmont Heights was a concern of some 
of the parents, but optimism lay with a group of fifty who were planning to connect 
with parents in Cheverly to work on easing "the sensitive transition period ahead."238 
One mother at the forum said the responsibility rested with all the parents to ensure 
there would be no violence at the school: "As parents, we can start at home right now, 
teaching our children to accept white students and teachers. It's up to parents to 
condition their children so they will come to Fairmont Heights with an open mind. 
All of the children must accept the fact that integration is here."239 
 Some Fairmont Heights students, however, were not getting that lesson. After 
an October loss against county football rival Potomac High, which had a 
predominantly white enrollment and football team, some Fairmont Heights students 
had violently rocked the bus carrying the Potomac team, and had thrown stones at the 
bus and at cars driven by whites.240  
 
 Nonetheless, other students were heeding the lesson of conciliation. In 
January 1970, about twenty-two black students from Fairmont Heights and thirty-five 
white students from Bladensburg met to inaugurate the Fairmont Heights-
Bladensburg High Schools' Student Relations Organization. With the goal of "easing 










integration tension this year to ease integration tension next year," the group at their 
first meeting agreed to share news in each other's school papers, provide tours of 
Fairmont Heights for Bladensburg students, and host more joint discussions." The 
organizers comprised what one girl described as the "elite" students, those who were 
involved in many activities and would know how to "build up relations" between 
students from the different schools.241  
 These students' engagement and initiative countered a better known but 
narrow view of desegregation, in which black school children were the disciplined 
outsiders valiantly, patiently, and quietly integrating the town's all-white school. 
Desegregation continued to be thought of by whites and some blacks as an endeavor 
in which only blacks were required to act, and to do so for the cause, while whites 
were asked only to be good hosts. This perception had been evident at a March 1969 
school desegregation meeting in Lakeland. In debating the question of whether the 
Lakeland School, in a black community, should remain open and be integrated by 
white children in two neighboring communities, a white parent said while they would 
welcome Lakeland children to their schools, they don't want white children 
transferred to Lakeland to achieve 'reverse integration.'"242 The integration of all-
black Fairmont Heights High and Bethune Junior High undermined the assumptions 
of federal government and local school district officials, for whom closing some 
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black schools and luring white students to Fairmont Heights with a Harvard-inspired 
curriculum were the most acceptable ways to achieve  desegregation.  
 
Cheverly 
Early in 1970, some white parents in the town of Cheverly, about a five-minute drive 
from Fairmont Heights High, initiated a challenge to the rezoning of their children 
from Bladensburg High to Fairmont Heights, a change that was to become effective 
in September when the new school year got under way. Cheverly residents were 
divided in planning how they would respond to the change, with some deciding to 
abide by the desegregation plan, some considering moving out of Cheverly, and 
others thinking of enrolling their children in private school. Some of the parents had 
contacted Fairmont Heights principal Alvin Fortune and were planning an open-house 
visit to the school; while others discussed filing a lawsuit against the county to stop 
the transfers altogether.243 In the spring of 1970, the ambivalence of some residents 
was further agitated by the school board's announcement that it would not fund the 
Model Urban School initiative at Fairmont Heights in the 1970-71 school year. The 
purportedly more challenging academic program Schmidt had thought might stoke 
white parents' interest in Fairmont Heights would no longer be offered at the school.  
 Todd Endo, one of the designers of the model program, wrote an angry letter 
of resignation warning the superintendent and school board that if the program, 
"which breaks out of the traditional mold of Bladensburg," was not implemented, 
then Fairmont Heights was "doomed to become another Bladensburg High with its 
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history of racial disorder."244 Endo's warning was rather vague, but he seemed to be 
suggesting that the racial troubles at Bladensburg had been the result of a lack of 
attention to the curricular interests of the "urban" or black student, for whom his 
team's model urban curriculum was designed. However, Endo also was lobbying for 
adoption of the program. He had made it clear that while his team "supported 
integration," they were not particularly concerned with it." Implementing the program 
for the current population of black students at Fairmont Heights was their goal.245   
 The model urban school was now out of the picture, and parents in Cheverly, 
who had shown no interest in the endeavor, moved forward with plans to sue the 
school district to keep their kids out of Fairmont Heights High and Bethune Junior 
High. Cheverly resident Ruth Davis did not join the suit though, determined her 
family would not move out of Cheverly and that her daughter would enroll in 
Bethune in the fall. "The quicker it's accepted, the quicker the transition will be," 
Davis had said.246 One of her neighbors expressed a viewpoint that was more typical 
of the residents who opposed the transfers: "I don't think any mother would like to be 
going over to the [Fairmont Heights High-Bethune] area to pick up her child after a 
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drama club meeting. There is a kind of racial and social antagonism. … I've heard 
remarks that they can't wait to get our kids over there."247  
 Most of the white Bladensburg High students who would be transferring to 
Fairmont Heights High lived in Cheverly and several nearby, smaller, still mostly 
white communities, including Radiant Valley, Dodge Park, and Kent Village.248 
Some streets in Cheverly were situated closer to Bladensburg High. Others, including 
those in the town's Ward 4, historically home to black families, were closer to 
Fairmont Heights High. The neighborhoods of Fairmount Heights, Chapel Oaks, 
North Englewood, Cedar Heights and others had been home for black families since 
the first two decades of the twentieth century. By the late 1960s, those black 
neighborhoods, though not as socio-economically middle-class as Cheverly, were as 
middle-class as the other white neighborhoods near Bladensburg High, and the 
graduates of both Fairmont Heights and Bladensburg were attending college at the 
same rate: thirty-seven percent.249   
 Unpersuaded that they should send their children to Fairmont Heights, eight 
Cheverly parents in February 1970 sued the Prince George's County school district to 
stop the transfers that were scheduled to happen in September, contending it was 
unconstitutional to use their children's race as a basis for assigning them to a school. 
A panel of county circuit court judges dismissed the suit two months later, and the 










parents sought a ruling by the Maryland Appeals Court, which sent the case back to 
the county circuit for a more thorough hearing of the arguments. In April 1971, the 
county circuit court ruled that in redrawing school attendance boundaries to eliminate 
segregation the county school district was acting within the law. The Supreme Court 
had just confirmed that to be so in the Charlotte, North Carolina case Swann vs. 
Mecklenburg County, a major follow-up ruling to Brown. There, the justices had 
decided that an extreme redrawing of attendance zones, resulting in noncontiguous 
boundaries, was an acceptable strategy for effecting the desegregation of schools. The 
decision also established the legitimacy of racial quotas as a means of determining the 
effectiveness of a desegregation plan. Basing its decision on that ruling, the Prince 
George's County Circuit Court ruled that the school board had acted correctly, that 
"its paramount consideration was the proper education of the children," and that the 
decision had rendered "no hardship."250 
 Ten months before the classrooms, hallways, and activities at Fairmont 
Heights High would be integrated for the first time, black and white children and 
parents in the communities near the school sorted through their racial attitudes. 
Blacks looked toward desegregation with cautious optimism, while most white 
parents conveyed skepticism. Neither group could further stall desegregation of the 
high school that had been a key factor in ensuring the county's compliance with 
federal requirements.     
  
                                                
 




Chapter 10: Teachers-Role Models 
The mandatory desegregation of teachers in American schools left black teachers far 
more vulnerable than whites to job displacement, transfers, unfair administrative 
scrutiny and degradation, and all-around professional instability. As the Prince 
George's County school district reassigned teachers to meet racial quotas, black 
faculty experienced angst over a number of issues, including being separated from 
their black students. The issue represented a perpetual conflict in the quest for 
desegregated schools. 
 
 The widely perceived notion among whites and many blacks that education in 
all-black schools was inherently inferior was a strand in the long and complex 
narrative of black life in America. The question of "lower education standards"251 
within the academic program at Fairmont Heights High connected to negative 
assumptions held by whites and blacks about the quality of instruction at Colored, 
Negro, and black schools. Political scientist Alvin Thornton suggests that "the 
deprivation of educational resources to black schools ensured blacks would develop a 
perception of their schools as inferior."252 It instilled the idea that "everything these 
poor little children had was bad, and so we need to go rescue them … the teachers are 
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bad, the curriculum was bad, the parents were bad. Everything was bad," a former 
teacher told education researchers Richard Milner and Tyrone Howard.253 
  In March 1971, Eloise Severinson regional director for the federal Office for 
Civil Rights, sent a reminder to superintendent Carl W. Hassel, who had replaced 
Schmidt a month earlier,254 informing him that the school district was legally 
obligated to desegregate faculty as well as students, a requirement that came out of 
the 1969 Mississippi case Singleton v. Jackson, another legal challenge to Brown. As 
the school district began desegregating faculty, black teachers grew concerned about 
the possible cultural dissonance between black children and white teachers. 
Diversifying faculty, though not the conundrum of shuffling and shuttling students, 
was still challenging, both in meaning and process. Confidently documenting their 
concerns about the dissolution of the black teacher-black student relationship, black 
teachers effectively blurred Thurgood Marshall's "unyielding integrationist 
worldview."255  
On March 25, the school board passed a resolution directing the 
superintendent to initiate staff assignments and transfers so that the number of black 
teachers in each school would reflect as near as possible the sixteen percent black 
teacher total in the school system. The board agreed in its final decision on the 
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measure to establish a black teacher representation of fifteen to twenty percent.256 
About a year later, on January 29, 1972, the black faculty at Glenarden Woods 
Elementary directed their concerns about the black teacher-black student relationship 
to board member Ruth Wolf. Principal Beatrice Henson and the faculty told Wolf that 
the number of white teachers at their school had exceeded the number of black and 
urged her to "let this remain as is." Meeting next year's black-white teacher ratio 
would further decrease the number of black teachers and "create problems for 
teachers and students," they wrote. Appealing further, they told Wolf: 
"Our student body is all black, and we deem it necessary to retain the black 
teachers who are presently on our staff in order that our black students might 
have black models to whom they can relate. …  Won't you please consider our 
unique situation – unique in that our neighborhood and our school are totally 
black -- and make the necessary concessions … for the benefit of these 
children who will ultimately be the ones to suffer if the teachers are 
removed."257   
  
 Changes in faculty assignments necessitated not only racial integration but the 
integration of teachers with different levels of experience, an issue the Glenarden 
Woods Elementary staff also raised in their letter: 
Last year, we received eight white teachers – new to teaching and new to our 
county. It was necessary for the remaining black teachers to work arduously 
with these new teachers in order to continue the quality of education required 
to meet the needs of our pupils.  … The removal of six more black teachers, 
who are the experienced teachers in this building, would gravely jeopardize 
the quality of education required to meet the needs of our pupils.258 
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 John Gruber, the president of the county teachers union, challenged the 
teachers' position and wrote school board president James Golato reminding him that 
the teacher transfer policy already had been negotiated. Gruber urged Golato to 
prioritize that agreement over black teachers' suggestion that "experienced teachers be 
exchanged for experienced teachers," which he claimed would be "contrary to 
educational practices."259 However, members of the county's Association of 
Elementary School Administrators and Supervisors "voted unanimously" to support 
the Glenarden Woods faculty out of "respect" for their colleagues' position. 
Association president Herbert Ryle said members had based their votes on the 
numbers of teachers each school would lose under the transfer policy, the negative 
effects on existing school programs, the impact on teacher morale, and "the ultimate 
criteria – what will be best for the pupils."260 
 In May, Golato asked his fellow board members to approve a resolution that 
would stop teacher transfers "until the student integration issue is resolved." The 
board voted down the resolution, however, reminded by its attorney that the district 
was under an HEW directive to increase the rate of voluntary faculty integration it 
                                                
 
259. "Letter from John Gruber to James Golato" (January 17, 1972), Staff Integration 
– Correspondence, Box 10, Folder 3, Ruth S. Wolf Papers, Special Collections, 
University of Maryland Libraries. 
 
260. "Letter, Association of Elementary School Administrators and Supervisors 
supporting Glenarden Woods Teachers" (March 8, 1972), Staff Integration – 
Correspondence, Box 10, Folder 3, Ruth S. Wolf Papers, Special Collections, 





had already begun.261 The angst of well-intentioned black school teachers revealed 
their own racial consciousness as well as concerns for their students' self-esteem 
within the context of school desegregation. They learned that they could not both 
protect the interests of their students and also comply with federal desegregation 
orders, an added disillusionment with the idealistic promise of Brown. 
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Chapter 11: Re-Coding Blackness 
As black and white students encountered one another in their desegregated 
classrooms and hallways, they projected their various individual and group identities, 
and lobbied for influence with school leadership. A typical concern among black 
students was the "lack of recognition for the race through the absence of black 
studies." Confidently, they began to press for both curriculum changes and more 
representation in school activities.262 To some degree, they achieved both.   
  
 On April 4, hours before King was assassinated, Maryland Governor Spiro T. 
Agnew had ordered the arrest of more than two hundred mostly black Bowie State 
College students who had traveled from the campus in Prince George's County to the 
Maryland State House in Annapolis to stage a "read-in" they hoped would call 
attention to dilapidated and neglectful conditions at the century-year-old black 
teachers college.263 In the spring of 1970 on the University of Maryland's main 
campus in College Park, which was within minutes of several Prince George's County 
high schools, leaders of the Black Student Union pushed the administration to recruit 
more black faculty and students and to restructure the existing black studies program, 
among a number of things.264  
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 Political scientist Manning Marable has noted that the mass civil rights stand-
offs in southern cities in the 1950s and 1960s were part of a "larger socio-economic, 
cultural, and political metamorphosis of American race relations."265 Campus 
protests, calls for black studies courses, and demands for increased representation in 
school activities were but one facet of a social transformation that, by the early 1970s, 
also had enabled a "deracialization of popular music."266 Songs, artists, producers, 
and marketers blurred the lines of difference between black and white teenagers 
sitting in classrooms together in greater numbers than ever before, and for the first 
time. This melding of differences within popular culture was quite evident in 1975 
when white, British pop star Elton John performed his top-selling song on the 
nationally syndicated television show “Soul Train,” a Chicago-based music-and-
dance program marketed to and widely viewed by black teenagers. John was the first 
white artist to perform on the program, whose engaging black host and youthful black 
dancers “helped sketch a portrait of black life that was radically ordinary,” 
anthropologist and historian Laurence Ralph has argued.  
 “The fact that the ritual of watching this show was taking place, 
simultaneously, in a geographically and racially diverse set of American households 
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is what helped hone an enduring appreciation for black culture,” Ralph said.267 In the 
midst of extreme desegregation battles, such cultural "rituals" also established 
common ground. 
 Black teenagers in Prince George's County began to experience this 
deracialization in the early 1970s as a result of desegregation, even before the 
desegregation court-order went into effect in January 1973. One of a few black 
students desegregated to Robert Goddard Junior High in the fall of 1972, Charles 
James recalls hanging out with "some stoners" there and starting to listen to "all that 
acid music" played more often by white bands. A trombonist and drummer at DuVal 
High from 1972 to 1975, he recalls that while he "didn't hang out with white 
musicians" in high school, he and his friends listened to "everything from Sly and the 
Family Stone, Boston, Led Zeppelin, Earth, Wind and Fire, Elton John."268 Though 
not a specific goal of Brown, school desegregation by the 1970s propelled cultural-
crossover sensibilities and behaviors that were evident but more socially taboo in the 
1950s and 1960s.  
 
 In October 1969, county social studies teachers and school administrators met 
with black student representatives from the high schools for a "listen in" on the topic 
of a black studies curriculum. Some students called for separate courses that would 
focus on contemporary issues, but others thought incorporating black studies into 
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other courses would give white students an opportunity "to learn something they don't 
know" and "see us in a different way."269 A few months later, in February 1970, 
Maryland's superintendent of education recommended to the state board of education 
that it require school systems throughout the state to add black studies to their 
curricula. The state board, however, refused to move on the suggestion.270 Within the 
year, though, Sandra White Minor's senior year at Bladensburg High, the school had 
added Black Studies and Asian Studies to the standard Social Studies course offerings 
– United States History, World History, Psychology, and Geography – as a of way of 
furthering "students' awareness of the world around him" and "our world 
neighbors."271 In 1972-73, the school added two sections of Black Studies, taught by 
Joseph Sciannella and Anne Fotos, both white. Sciannella also taught a new issues-
related course that year, Urban Geography, which "dealt with the planning of cities 
and the problems facing them."272  
 Minor credits earlier black graduates of the school, including alumnus Wayne 
Curry, for forging a path for the black students who came later. "By the time our class 
got there, you could just feel the stir-up … and the classes that followed kept it 
going." Although the school had a vocational curriculum, "blacks weren't accepted 
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into the nursing program," Minor said. "We petitioned for that. By the time of my 
junior year, they made sure there was somebody black in every organization."273  
 The complexities and ambiguities of school desegregation could not be 
separated from the social, cultural, and political movements that young Americans of 
the era observed and in which they participated. Black students inspired by the core 
messages of these movements were empowered to establish within their integrated 
schools a space for themselves, and to locate common ground with white students. 
  
                                                
 




Chapter 12: Dismantling the System 
Convinced the idle school board would not commit to the large-scale reassignment of 
white students, the NAACP and American Civil Liberties Union moved forward with 
a lawsuit against the county school board, on behalf of several black parents. 
Responding to Judge Frank A. Kaufman's request for proposals from the school 
district, two white members of the board drew up a hostile desegregation proposal 
that provoked black residents' unified, massive resistance against it. Expressing no 
confidence in the board's commitment to drafting an effective and comprehensive 
desegregation plan, Judge Kaufman issued a decisive ruling for the plaintiffs, along 
with a detailed plan for desegregating the school system. Black Prince Georgians 
continued to influence the execution of the court order, although they certainly did 
not control it. They both supported desegregation and opposed implementation 
schemes that unequally burdened their children. 
  
 Throughout most of 1971, desegregation efforts in the county increasingly 
proved to be a stand-off between and among the school superintendent, members of 
the school board, the teachers' union, HEW, and the community. With an enrollment 
of 162,000 students, twenty-two percent of whom were black, Prince George's 
County Public Schools was the tenth-largest school district in the nation.274 Stalled by 
the anti-desegregation majority on the school board, which still had only one black 
member, the district's desegregation planning had resulted in nine of the eighteen 
county high schools still having a white-student population that exceeded ninety 
                                                




percent, and four high schools still registering black-student enrollment of more than 
fifty percent.275 Determined to maintain neighborhood-school attendance zones and 
appease increasingly vehement anti-busing white parent groups, district leaders 
worked half-heartedly to devise a desegregation plan that would be acceptable to 
HEW, with five of the nine school board members firmly opposed to using busing as 
a desegregation tool, despite the Supreme Court's April decision endorsing busing an 
acceptable way to desegregate schools "in a system that had been deliberately 
constructed and maintained to enforce racial segregation."276 Mocking HEW's 
persistence as "the insatiable appetite of a bureaucratic arm of the federal 
government,"277 the inflexible school board backed themselves into a corner that left 
them either facing HEW sanctions or forcing the "matter be resolved in the courts," 
with the latter consequence favored by Maryland Congressman Lawrence Hogan.278  
 
 Observing the stalemate and possible derailment of its school desegregation 
goals for Prince George's County, an NAACP legal representative in New York said 
the organization had "the matter under active consideration with a view to filing a 
lawsuit," whether or not HEW went forward with financial sanctions or a suit against 
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the county.279 Directors of Prince George's Model Cities program so resented the 
school board's obstructionism in expanding desegregation that they canceled a 
pending partnership with the school system. Model Cities had been considering 
funding two afterschool instructional and recreational programs, which would serve 
mostly black children in the program's partner communities. Dissatisfied with the 
board's inflexibility on busing, Model Cities Director Sylvester Vaughns ended 
negotiations with the county and began seeking another partner agency for the 
program.  
 The audacity of school and elected officials, and of white parents' 
"overwhelming opposition to the busing and destruction of county schools"280 
intensified blacks' interest in taking legal action against the system. Between August 
1970 and February 1972, the board had gone against school district policy and 
allowed twenty-nine Bladensburg High students without the required criteria to 
remain at the school anyway instead of transferring to Fairmont Heights High;281 
rejected a proposal developed by its own administrative staff that would have 
"achieved substantial integration" by busing 7,352 children between nine majority 
black schools and thirty-one majority white schools;282 rejected for the third time a 
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proposal by Jesse Warr, the only black board member, to establish new and larger 
attendance zones that would give every school a twenty-two percent black population, 
matching the black population rate in the county;283 and approved a plan to open two 
new junior high schools that each would have ninety percent white enrollment.284 
 Faced with this culture of resistance to desegregation among the county's 
education policy makers, eight black parents in Prince George's County filed suit 
against the county on March 29, 1972, for maintaining a racially segregated public 
school system, in violation of Brown vs. Board of Education. They were represented 
by the local chapters of the NAACP and the ACLU. The school district's size and 
proximity to the Nation's Capital helped account for regular and extensive local and 
national media coverage of the court proceedings, especially pertaining to the large-
scale, cross-county busing of students, which was required to meet black-white racial-
balance within each school. In the weeks before the filing of the lawsuit, bureaucrats 
and politicians all over the country were weighing in on the merits and drawbacks of 
busing children miles outside their neighborhood as a means to desegregate schools. 
Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter, "generally considered a racial moderate," got 
behind the idea of pushing Congress to call a constitutional convention on busing. 
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Carter said he would support a one-day, statewide public school boycott if the 
Georgia House did not join the state Senate in pressing Congress to do so.285  
 Attempting to ameliorate the nationwide busing debate, President Richard M. 
Nixon appointed a committee to examine ways around busing as a means to achieve 
desegregation. HEW Secretary Elliott Richardson, chairing the committee, said a 
proposed Constitutional amendment to make it unlawful for public schools to use race 
as a factor in assigning children to schools seemed to further support the Brown 
ruling. Richardson also suggested that such a law would undermine successful school 
desegregation efforts that had been implemented without busing. Months later, while 
presiding over the desegregation lawsuit in Prince George's County, Judge Kaufman 
asserted that county residents' opposition to busing was not based in a knowledge of 
the facts. "Transportation to school on school buses, at any school level, is not 
presently the exception," Kaufman said. "Busing is an existing condition for nearly 
one-half of the entire student population and more than one-third of the elementary 
school population."286  
  
 Sylvester Vaughns, a plaintiff in the Prince George’s County parents' lawsuit, 
had moved in 1966 into the county's Palmer Park subdivision, a historically white 
neighborhood that was significantly black by 1972. The town's population had begun 
shifting around 1971, as real estate agents urged white homeowners to sell their 
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houses at low prices to avoid property-value losses they claimed would occur as more 
black families purchased homes in the community.287 A North Carolina native, 
Vaughns had spent half of his own school days in the classroom and the other half 
working in cotton fields. His determination in pushing for desegregation was tied 
directly to his incomplete, segregated education in North Carolina. Vaughns claimed 
the quality of his son's education at Kentland Junior High in Palmer Park had 
decreased as the enrollment had become predominantly black. After filing the law 
suit in March, he told Washington Post reporter Philip McCombs that he thought 
segregation had "a psychological effect on children that can never be undone." 
Recalling how work in the cotton fields had "cheated" him out his education, 
Vaughns said, "I swore it would never happen to my children. … Schools get more 
when they are desegregated."288  
 In addition to the broad charge of operating a segregated school system in 
violation of Brown, the eight parents who initiated the lawsuit made a number of 
other charges against the school board, accusations that succeed in revealing the 
schools system's willful noncompliance with Brown, including: racial discrimination 
in utilizing, recruiting, promoting and demoting black staff; unequal allocation of 
resources to racially identifiable schools; maintaining sixty-one percent of black 
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student enrollment in majority-black schools; and operating a "permissive transfer 
system under which white students in majority-black schools could transfer to 
majority-white schools."289 The charges were not only an assertion of the plaintiffs' 
claim to equal protection and an underscoring of their right, as black citizens, to 
demand their rights. The specificity of the charges against the system left no doubt 
that the parents were acknowledging their group's difference – race – and were 
accusing the board of treating them differently because of their race. They were 
declaring their right to be black and also be entitled to civil rights, as well as their 
right to formally object to a withholding of those rights.  
 As the summer of 1972 progressed, Judge Kaufman ruled that the county's 
segregated school system had never been “effectively dismantled” and ordered the 
board of education to develop a desegregation plan by August 22 that “promises 
realistically to work … until it is clear that state-imposed segregation has been 
completely removed,” as the U.S. Supreme Court had stipulated in 1967 in Green v. 
County School Board of New Kent County, Virginia,  a decision that established 
freedom-of-choice plans as insufficient means of racially unifying school districts.290 
Responding to the judge's order, school board members Rodney W. Johnson and A. 
James Golato on September 12 presented a plan that recommended the closing of 
seven all-black schools and a moratorium on school construction "in the area of the 
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county between the Capital Beltway and the District of Columbia line, the area of 
greatest black growth in Prince George's."291 
 By September 26, blacks in the county had coalesced to push back against the 
Johnson and Golato proposal. At a public meeting that evening, the board was 
delivered two petitions with six thousand signatures. "The crowd of black parents and 
school children at yesterday's hearing gave the most dramatic indication to date of 
black sentiment on the desegregation issue," reporter Herbert H. Denton noted. 
During the "often emotional" forum, speakers said they resented black children being 
expected to bear the brunt of busing, even in the interest of furthering desegregation, 
which many supported. There also was opposition to converting Fairmont Heights 
High to a performing arts school and its neighbor Bethune Junior High to a science 
and vocational center, both with voluntary enrollment.292  
 John J. Williams, president of the Fairmont Park-Chapel Oaks-North 
Englewood civic association, delivered a strong reprimand of the Johnson-Golato 
proposal, saying the plan was "just what is needed to complete the school board's 
nineteen-year history of continued refusal to comply with the law." He noted the 
paradox of both Johnson and Golato, known opponents of busing, having become 
proponents of a plan that would use busing as a "one-way proposition – black only." 
Speaking for the whole black community, Williams told the board, "No longer will 
we sit idle and let you destroy our children's educational opportunities, then our 
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schools, and finally, our communities."293 Accusing board members of complicity in 
diverting black families' home ownership aspirations, as well, Williams lambasted 
their overall obstructionism: "I suggest those board members whose conflict of 
interest is seemingly for housing, to resign and join the Board of Realtors where your 
plan might be more appreciated," he told them. We have not forgotten it was the 
Board of Realtors and police organizations who openly opposed the passage of the 
Human Relations Commission and Fair Housing Bill."294 
 
 James L. Gainey, chairman of the Model Neighborhood Action Board, also 
testified against the Johnson-Golato resolution, saying that the board engages with the 
county's black community in a paternal matter. "This kind of 'we know what's best for 
you attitude' is socioeconomic genocide in our community," Gainey told the board 
members. Articulating the same collective ownership of schools in black 
communities as white parents articulated about schools in their communities, Gainey 
told the board "these schools are valuable assets to us, and must be preserved at all 
costs." Conveying an expectation of fairness from the school board, Gainey told them 
that "the citizens of the Model Neighborhood Area will support every effort to 
support equiponderant desegregation planning."295  
                                                
293. "Statement of Fairmont Park, Chapel Oaks, North Englewood Civic Association 
Letter to Board of Education" (September 26, 1972), Community Response Box 3, 









 Sylvester Vaughns said Johnson and Golato's true intention in drafting the 
proposal had been to draw out blacks who also were against further desegregation, a 
plausible accusation as the two had throughout the year "opposed every move" to 
further desegregation and abstained from voting on their own proposal at the 
September public meeting.296 At the time of the NAACP lawsuit filing six months 
earlier,  a little more than sixty percent of black students still were attending schools 
with enrollments that were more than fifty percent black, and more than sixty-six 
percent of white students were attending schools that were more than ninety percent 
white.297  
 On December 20, 1972, a group of black parents met with school officials to 
press for answers on the proposed closing of Fairmount Heights Elementary. A leaky 
radiator and undependable boiler were among the problems that led the school board 
to declare the thirty-seven-year-old building substandard and to close it. Parents and 
the principal had lobbied the school board to address the issues, but the school 
received only assurances of repairs, not actual repairs, even when children sat in 
unhealthy and unsanitary conditions. Among six schools that had been declared 
substandard the previous year, three were for black students and three were for white 
students. By the time of the December meeting, the three white schools had been 
removed from the substandard list and made operational. The school board 
shamelessly, it seemed, explained that the repairs had been made at those schools "to 
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minimize the increase in transfers and minimize busing" related to desegregation, the 
Washington Post reported the day after the Fairmount Heights Elementary meeting.298 
County officials' blatant disregard for the educational rights of black children 
prompted some black parents to ask "whether the county school system decided that 
some black schools are substandard and should be closed… only when it became 
clear that white students would be transferred into them" through the desegregation 
plan.299 The board's irresponsible and unaccountable management also might have 
been a reminder of the indignation and impatience that had fueled Marshall's crusade 
against segregation in America's public schools.  The bold response of this school's 
black parents, if nothing else, cast a moral scrutiny over the preferential and 
prejudicial actions of county leaders. Further, their response was an unabashed 
assertion of their racial identity in the face of school officials' attempts to deny racial 
motivations in their decision making. 
  
 After nine months of hearings, stern judicial orders, and contentious public 
meetings, the county school board failed to draft a desegregation plan that was in 
compliance with Brown, the subsequent federal court rulings, or the standards 
established by the federal government. On December 29, 1972, a fed-up Judge 
Kaufman ordered the Prince George's County school district to activate one of four 
proposals it had submitted for review earlier that month. First noting that one of the 
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four proposals "was based on the same freedom of choice principles that had failed … 
in the past," Kaufman then went on to commend "the efforts and accomplishments" of 
the "school board staff members who, as professionals," did what the board itself had 
not done, "demonstrate[ed] the willingness and the ability under time pressure to 
produce a constitutional plan."300  
 The approved desegregation plan was to be activated January 29, 1973, the 
middle of the school year. It exempted high school seniors from the transfers until the 
following school year. The plan called for a decrease in the number of schools that 
were overwhelmingly black or overwhelmingly white from 162 to 11 and the 
transporting by school bus of 8,572 black students and 4,705 white students who had 
previously walked to school. It ensured a black-student population within each school 
that would be at least ten percent and at most fifty percent of the total number of 
students within the school. Addressing anti-busing activists, Kaufman clarified that 
"in Prince George's County, transportation to school on school buses is not presently, 
at any school level, the exception. Rather, busing is an existing condition for nearly 
one-half of the entire student population and more than one-third of the elementary 
school population."301 
 County officials had been brash in exposing their anti-desegregation 
intentions, emboldened not only by southern tradition but, perhaps, also by the 1972 
candidacy of George Wallace. Two months before Judge Kaufman's busing order 
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went into effect, Democratic presidential candidates George McGovern and Hubert 
Humphrey had split the majority of their party's votes in Maryland, which gave the 
state's presidential primary victory to Wallace, the candidate who had made a litany 
out of the word "segregation." Wallace also won Prince George's County, whose 
county executive, William W. Gullett, was Republican.  
 Without community pressure, litigation, and judicial intervention, black 
communities in the county that were determined to gain educational justice might 
have had to wait even longer for a thorough shake-up of the status quo in the 
county.302  
  
                                                






Chapter 13: "Why Did You Tell Them We Were Human?" 
When busing went into effect in January 2003, black students in Prince George's 
County had varied expectations and reservations. Decades later, they recalled their 
experiences, which had both affirmed and expanded their racial attitudes. Although 
conflict erupted between black and white students at some Prince George’s County 
County schools, dissension also arose among blacks, a dimension of the 
desegregation struggle that other historians have rarely noted. Here, I suggest that 
the conflict among black teens from different neighborhoods at one high school was 
less about class differences than about the divergent senses of belonging or fitting in 
within a majority-white school, occasioned by the length of time each group had been 
attending the particular desegregated school.   
 
 On December 19, 1972, a Washington Post reporter stopped by Central High 
in Capital Heights to put together a story for the next day's paper that involved 
desegregation, a boycott, anticipation, and fear. Central's white-student enrollment 
was eight percent. In the mid-1960s, the school had been predominantly white, before 
desegregation increased the number of black students there, and before whites began 
to move out of the school's attendance zone. That morning, a student boycott 
protesting the January desegregation order was in effect, pushed forward by a white 
senior at Parkdale High and a white Lanham parent who was a leading anti-busing 
activist. About 8,000 of the district's 68,000 junior high and senior high school 
students, most in the north-county region, had not shown up for classes. Parkdale 
High registered a fifty-five percent absentee rate and Bladensburg Junior High fifty 




absences at Central High, Fairmont Heights High, and the other predominantly black 
schools closer to the city averaged only about ten percent above the average rate.  
 Some Central students were in classes, some skipping classes and hanging out 
in the cafeteria and hallways, and still others were gathered in the school library. A 
student who was in the cafeteria spotted the reporter and called out to him, 
encouraging him to interview "not just the 'A' students in the library about busing" 
but to also "talk to some 'B' and 'C' and 'D' students here." The reporter interviewed 
both groups.303  
 Speaking in terms of "we," "they," "whitey," and being "outnumbered," the 
students were anxious about the transfers that would begin in about one month. They 
worried over a number of things: doing well enough to keep up with the white 
students, fights, their school's reputation for violence following them to the new 
school, whether the library would have books by black writers and a black studies 
class, and whether high school was too late for desegregating students. The student 
council leader told the group gathered in the library that he had been in meetings with 
white students from other schools who seemed to be afraid of the Central students. 
"Why didn't you tell them we were human?" a girl asked him. "I did." he said. "I told 
them we don’t bite."304 
 Students' fears were grounded in more than just new-school jitters. The anti-
busing campaigns in the county had been aggressive and filled with racist rhetoric. In 
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the month leading up to the transfer day, January 29, 1973, Conrad Briggs had gone 
with his parents to a meeting at his new school, Beltsville Junior High. It had been 
organized to ensure a smooth transition for the incoming students from Thomas 
Johnson Junior High. Conrad recalled that the meeting "looked like something out of 
a movie." 
People are jumping to their feet and saying, 'Niggers in my school are going to 
make it dangerous for my daughter!' Black and white parents sitting on 
opposite sides of the room. Blacks seething and occasionally responding, … 
We don't want to come up here either, we don’t want our kids an extra ten to 
fifteen more miles from home.'  … 
 
My dad, several fathers, followed us, took time off work and escorted the 
school buses and watched us go in and made sure we were safe, and did that 
for the first two or three days. Once we got there, there were white people at 
Beltsville who were just like many of the white people at Thomas Johnson: 
'Hey, we're glad you're here. Don't worry about all the craziness. School is 
school. I'm a professional, you're a kid, we're going to do the school thing!' 305 
 
 Having completed five uneasy months at Beltsville Junior High, Conrad in 
September 1973 moved on to tenth grade at DuVal High. Reuniting with the Thomas 
Johnson classmates from whom he had been separated the previous January and 
making new friends, black and white, Conrad's tenure in high school was the vision 
Thurgood Marshall must have imagined, and his views on racial relations became 
more analytical: "I didn't know that white people weren't all the same. We thought 
they were all the same, socioeconomically. What I knew [afterward] was that we're 
not that different. … The people living in any particular neighborhood or the 
neighborhoods that fed DuVal, were essentially living the same lives." 
 





 At seven years old and in second grade, Barrett Matthews' world was small 
and uncomplicated. He had attended kindergarten and first grade at Glenarden Woods 
Elementary, where his kindergarten teacher had been among the first white faculty 
members. He could stand in his front yard and see his school; his first-grade teacher 
lived three doors down and across the street; and his two best friends lived up the 
street. On January 29, he rode a bus to school for the first time, transferred to 
Whitehall Elementary in the predominantly white community of Bowie as part of the 
school district's court-ordered desegregation plan.306 
 As he was heading to Whitehall, his Glenarden Woods classmates throughout 
the community were boarding school buses headed to other schools in other 
neighborhoods, the result of the cross-county busing plan. His two best friends and 
several other neighbors a street or two over from his also had been assigned to 
Whitehall. That he had two friends on his street going to the same school, Barrett 
said, "was the thing that mattered the most to me. Otherwise, it would have felt 
isolating."   
 Even though he did not experience isolation, attending Whitehall was not a 
color-blind experience either: "We were old enough to know black and white" and 
were "definitely" aware that there weren't many other black people at the school, 
Barrett said. "That's why many of the fights started in the beginning," because of 
name calling and territory claiming, he recalled.  
                                                





 It was the teachers who were "the peacemakers," he remembered. "They were 
just trying to make us feel comfortable there." On the first day of school, the students 
in his class gave him a welcome letter they had written, which his mother still has. 
The physical education teacher, a white man, made a particular effort to mitigate 
socio-cultural differences among the black and white students and try to establish 
some common ground. "Mr. Herman decided that since many of us boys [from 
Glenarden] played football and the white kids played soccer, he would teach all of us 
rugby!" Barrett recalled307 
 
 While it was expected that the desegregation of schools would generate 
tension and confrontations between black and white students, discord among black 
students from different neighborhoods might not have been anticipated. However, 
hostility among blacks did manifest. Recalling the experience of leaving the Lakeland 
community in the early 1970s to attend Greenbelt Junior High, about two miles from 
Lakeland, Maxine Gross said it was at first easy because she still was with her 
lifelong friends and neighbors. "You knew the same people, you knew their mother 
and their father, you had that sense of community," she recalled.308  
 In January 1973 when court-ordered busing went into effect, Maxine and her 
twin sister, Delphine, were in eighth grade and their second year at Greenbelt Junior 
High. The county's desegregation plan would bring to the school almost five hundred 
new black students from three junior high schools in the county's central corridor, ten 
                                                






miles south and east of Greenbelt. Thinking back to the midyear enrollment of the 
new black students and her perception of the effect they had on the school, Maxine 
describes an environment that went from "not particularly hospitable" to intimidating: 
"These [new] students would physically fight the teachers. … The teachers seemed 
like they were scared to death." It caught her by surprise. "We did not have that sense 
in Lakeland, that you were going to go to school and cut up. There was a lot of 
discussion … that the kids from Lakeland were different, that we weren't 'as black,'" 
Maxine recalled. She said taunts of "acting white" were not infrequent. "You ended 
up not knowing what you were. You were neither black enough nor white enough."309 
 What was the source of the antagonism between the black students from 
Lakeland and the new black students? Did desegregation create the situation for this 
hostility? Had Maxine met her new classmates in an all-black school would there 
have been the same lack of accord among them? Were studiousness and pursuit of 
academic success, endeavors that have commonly been labeled as acting white, 
triggers for the other students' taunts?  
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 Accusing their black classmates of acting white was a way of affirming their 
own racial and cultural identity, an acknowledgement, as DuBois noted, that they did 
not want to "cease to be Negroes and become white in action and thought … to take 
on the culture of white Americans, doing what they do and thinking what they 
think."310 In the environment in which they were placed – new, distant from home, 
white-dominated – such self-validation was necessary.  
 Yet, were the black children from Lakeland and Palmer Park so different? 
There is no evidence to suggest that Lakeland parents had grounded their children in 
codes of conduct that Palmer Park parents had not. I suggest that the conduct among 
the black students who were bused to Greenbelt Junior High in 1973 as a result of the 
court order also manifested the stigma that was attached to busing, but specifically, 
the busing of black children into white communities. The fundamental basis for this 
stigma, held by some blacks and whites, was the assumption at the time of Brown and 
for the next two decades that remediating the quality of black children's education – 
more essential than racial mixing for some blacks – justified dislocating them to 
white schools. From the perspective of school district leaders and many white parents, 
black students wanted the instruction, resources, and facilities available only in the 
white schools. Black schools were perceived as having no value for white students, 
and white spaces were projected as having inherent value. Black students relocated to 
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those white spaces were seen as beneficiaries of white largesse, while the busing of 
white students was viewed as an aberration.  
 The social distance between the newly arrived black students and the 
Lakeland students also can be explained by the fact that Lakeland students had been 
desegregated to Greenbelt Junior High in the fall of 1964, when the county had 
rezoned them from Bethune Junior High. By January 1973, Lakeland children had an 
established presence at Greenbelt Junior High, which was not the case for the new 
black students bused from the central-county neighborhoods. If those factors were not 
enough to complicate the possibility of their seamless integration and socialization at 
Greenbelt Junior, there was the fact that they were transferred from three different 
junior high schools – 208 from Maryland Park, 194 from Thomas Pullen, and 80 from 
Bethune. One group's ride to school covered about ten miles, while the other two 
groups rode about seven miles.311 About 417 white Greenbelt students had been 
transferred to Bethune Junior High. 
 Although neither Maxine Gross nor any other student was likely to draw this 
conclusion at the time, their classmates' disruptive and anti-social conduct, or 
behaviors perceived to be so, were a manifestation of their sense of not belonging. 
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Political scientist William E. Nelson concluded that when black students were 
desegregated into white schools their exclusion from the school's "social and 
governmental network" culminated in "an immense loss" for the black student. 
According to Nelson, "in the desegregated school, the black student must subordinate 
his sense of group identity and school spirit and accept the preferences of the white 
majority. … In this environment, black students frequently develop feelings of not 
belonging to the school and strike back through acts of rebellion."312  
 
 Even though they were not new to Greenbelt Junior High, Lakeland students 
in the late 1960s had mixed experiences with race while there. Benay Gray Hawkins 
said she doesn't "remember feeling tension from teachers or anything" while at 
Greenbelt from 1966 to 1969. "We went to their dances. ... I liked the classes. I don't 
remember any teacher saying anything they shouldn't have said," Benay recalled. 
Years later though, conversations with her Lakeland friends over the years convinced 
her that some of them "would say they felt the racism" while at Greenbelt.313  
 I contend that the chaotic nature of the midyear transfer, as well as the angry 
and bitter atmosphere in which desegregation was taking place in the county, 
compounded an experience that already would have been, at best, overwhelming, 
confusing, and uneasy for black students who came to Greenbelt as a result of the 
                                                
312. William E. Nelson Jr., "School Desegregation and the Black Community," 
Theory into Practice 26, Educational Perspectives Then and Now (December 1988): 
454, accessed May 12, 2017, http://www.jstor.org.proxy-
um.researchport.umd.edu/stable/1476266 
 





federal court order. While it could be argued that Lakeland children, who were part of 
a generations-old black community with a documented commitment to public 
education, prioritized conventional discipline in school while the families of the black 
children who were new to Greenbelt Jr. High did not, my research found no evidence 
to support that notion. 
 
 What can be evidenced nearly two decades after Brown is that black parents 
throughout the county had an understanding of both the benefits and the possible 
harm of desegregation, and desegregation activism was in force over those two 
decades. In the central-county neighborhood of Palmer Park, a 1950s white 
subdivision that in the mid-1960s drew many black families moving from 
Washington, D.C. – who pushed out the white families – civic and political 
engagement was strong. Palmer Park resident Sylvester Vaughns chaired the county's 
Model Cities Advisory Board, and would become a lead litigant in the 1972 lawsuit 
challenging the county's desegregation policies. Another Palmer Park parent, 
concerned in 1972 that new desegregation plans would require her two daughters to 
walk across a busy highway to a new school, said she didn't know if blacks "want to 
be integrated so much as we want equal resources. I don't think we want to be next to 
them any more than they want to be next to us."314 
 A black social studies teacher at Parkdale High in 1974 took another view of 
desegregation, at least as it related to black children in Lakeland, Maxine Gross 
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remembered: "He said we were all from the plantation, [referring] to Lakeland as the 
plantation." At the time, she thought he was calling them slaves. "Saying it to a bunch 
of teenagers was probably not a good choice," but, she says, "in a way, it was kind of 
true, in that Lakeland was in a lot of ways dependent upon the University of 
Maryland for sustenance. But that's not necessarily a bad thing."315 
  
 On January 30, 1973, two days after court-ordered, countywide busing got 
under way, the Prince George's County delegates in the Maryland General Assembly 
passed a bill that proposed replacing the county's governor-appointed school board 
with an elected board. The only dissenting representative was Arthur King, son of 
Hester King, the leader of the county's NAACP through the early 1960s. King's 
opposition to the bill was based in a reasonable fear that "candidates articulating the 
most extreme anti-busing sentiments," supported by groups who wanted to remove 
the school board members they blamed for court-ordered busing, would 
overwhelmingly win a countywide election and return segregation to the schools.316 
"People are being misled into thinking they can solve the desegregation issue by 
having an elected school board," King had said when the bill was introduced.317  
 Despite his efforts and as he had feared, county voters on November 6, 1973, 
elected six school board members who were supported by the anti-busing group 
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Citizens for Community Schools. Ruth Wolf, the white, pro-desegregation incumbent 
from Cheverly, lost in the election. Many voters in the predominantly white town, 
including former schools superintendent William S. Schmidt, had vocally opposed 
desegregation and, in the case of Schmidt, had impeded it by supporting 
segregationist policies. Jesse J. Warr remained the only black member on the school 
board, his victory enabled by a bill out of the state legislature that established at-large 
school board districts in Prince George's and that aligned election districts with 
legislative districts, which ensured a majority-black election district in the 
communities near Fairmont Heights High School.318 They had engaged in a steady 
and persistent fight, but blacks in the county had not surmounted conventional racial 
prejudice and discrimination.  
 As HEW and pro-desegregation factions pushed to increase desegregation in 
all county schools, white families began to withdraw their children from the schools. 
Over two years, from 1970 to 1972, the county registered a decrease of 7,300 white 
students. From the fall of 1972, when the court issued its desegregation order, to the 
fall of 1973, eight months after the order went into effect, more than 11,000 white 
students left county schools, and nearly 6,000 withdrew between the fall of 1973 and 
the fall of 1974. During the same period, black-student enrollment, on the increase 
since the 1960s, further increased by 5,591.319 
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Chapter 14: Beyond 1974 
The departure of white Prince George's County families opposed to busing created 
within a few years after the 1972 court order a black-student majority in the county 
school system. Dividing along income and class lines, some blacks debated whether 
busing still was necessary while others argued that prejudice and discrimination 
among blacks, based on income status, had replaced racial discrimination. Similar to 
Prince George's County's, Atlanta, Georgia, by 1980 also had experienced a 
population shift to majority black, with the fear of desegregated city schools having 
pushed whites out of the central city in the 1970s. However, Atlanta never attempted 
a massive busing program, making Prince George’s County's desegregation history 
unique among the most studied school desegregation stories.320 Further, in Prince 
George's County, busing had led to school desegregation moving from being an 
interracial conflict to an entanglement of differences among black people. 
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Following a 1959 court order to desegregate Atlanta's public schools, the Georgia 
governor appointed an influential white businessman to facilitate the planning. His 
subsequent recommendations included, among other things, providing grants to 
students who found themselves in desegregated schools and wanted to transfer. When 
the state ended de jure segregation in 1961, de facto segregation persisted. Yet, the 
cadre of black college students who came to the city in the 1960s brought with them a 
civil rights impetus. Negotiating with the city in the 1970s for further desegregation, 
they agreed to the hiring of a black superintendent of city schools in exchange for 
limiting their busing goals. Whites were leaving Atlanta though and more blacks were 
arriving, rendering a two-thirds black majority in the city by1980, according to the 





 On November 8, 1975, a story in the Afro-American reported that Prince 
George's County could face more busing. "Schools that had black-white student ratios 
acceptable to the court in 1973 had reverted to ratios the court had outlawed in the 
lawsuit. The percentage of blacks living in the county grew from 8 percent to 37 
percent between 1960 and 1980.321 From 1970 to 1980, black student enrollment 
climbed from 31,994 to 60,793, as white student enrollment dropped by more than 
half, from 127,798 to 56,031.322 These dramatic shifts made it impossible to maintain 
the court-ordered ten percent minimum and fifty percent maximum black-student 
representation within each school. Yet, another dynamic would exacerbate 
desegregation efforts in a way that might have been predicted but was not.  
 Toward the end of the 1970s, class fissures became evident within Prince 
George’s black communities, as families with increasing income were integrating 
historically white neighborhoods that had consistently well-resourced schools. These 
wealthier black families pushed the school board to stop busing their children out of 
their integrated communities, thus overtly undermining the possibility of a unified 
educational agenda among blacks and leading to a redefining of desegregation. The 
new contingent organized its opposition in the form of Blacks Against Unnecessary 
Busing. In 1979, increasing disagreement over the direction of school desegregation 
and busing led then-NAACP president William Martin to meet secretly with school 
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board chairman Norman Saunders, and board attorney Paul Nussbaum to make 
revisions to the 1972 court order, without the knowledge of the rest of the school 
board members, nor authorization of NAACP national headquarters. Martin's plan 
would have allowed black children in some middle-class, integrated neighborhoods, 
such as his, to attend schools within or closer to those neighborhoods. The plan ran 
into several problems. Other local NAACP members informed the national office of 
Martin's move, and he was permanently suspended from the organization. As 
imagined or realized through Brown, school desegregation was a mechanism to 
ensure black children could freely access and were equitably educated in the nation's 
public schools. In Prince George's, a faction of black leadership was demonstrating 
that they considered educational equity a premium only for children whose parents 
could afford to supplement their neighborhood school with more than the basic 
resources.  
 In 1981, NAACP officials claimed that the black-white student ratio at a 
number of county schools was out of compliance with the court-ordered standard set 
in 1972: black student enrollment was not to fall below ten percent nor exceed fifty 
percent. With more blacks having moved into the county since 1973 and many whites 
having moved out, black enrollment at more than half of county schools exceeded 
fifty percent, and at some schools reached seventy percent.323 NAACP leaders asked 
Judge Kaufman to reopen the 1972 desegregation case.  
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 Ruling on his review of the situation in 1983, Kaufman determined that the 
county school system had retained "vestiges of segregation" and ordered the 
convening of a citizens panel to remediate the district's compliance problems and 
make recommendations for remedy. The board appealed Kaufman's decision, but two 
years later, in March 1985, an appeals court agreed with Kaufman. Two weeks after 
that, the report of the citizens panel created an even bigger stir than the loss of the 
appeal. The panel's recommendations amounted to the busing of more students, black 
and white; longer bus rides; and the closing of thirty-two schools, nearly half of them 
in black neighborhoods. The recommendations did not convey the mood of the 
community. As political scientist Alvin Thornton and educator Eva Wells Chunn 
would later point out in their discussion of one-race magnet schools, black county 
residents "had grown tired of schools closing in their communities and resented that 
their children bore the primary burden of busing." Even more significant, black 
families had no evidence desegregation was enabling academic gains.324  
 The school district did not adopt the recommendations of the citizens panel 
but agreed with the NAACP on a new strategy for desegregating the schools: 
establishing special-interest "magnet" programs in focused curricula, such as math, 
arts, and foreign language, to draw white students to schools in black communities. 
Magnet-based desegregation also would include a component, the Milliken II 
Program, that would allow the district to maintain one-race schools in neighborhoods 
where there was a "concentration of certain schools with black student enrollments 
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over eighty percent." Those schools would receive "compensatory and remedial 
programs and equipment."325 The new plan was slated to begin in the 1985-86 school 
year. 
 As it was being developed, an ad hoc committee of local black organizational 
and political leaders suggested the school district set a different goal -- "desegregation 
to achieve high-quality education rather than to achieve desegregation," and to do 
"what was required to make education work for black students, regardless of the 
racial composition of the schools they attended."326 Organized as the Ad Hoc 
Committee to Achieve Quality Education in Prince George's County, this group of 
black leaders made additional recommendations to the school board regarding the 
interests of black students and employees, including increasing the number of black 
school administrators and equalizing the allocation of resources among black-
majority and white-majority schools. 
 Public education is highly vulnerable to political interests, and in the 1990s, 
Prince George's County's political leadership was black. Alvin Thornton, a black 
Alabama native, Howard University political science professor, and county resident 
won a seat on the school board in 1992. Curry, a Maryland-trained attorney who had 
attended the county's elementary, junior high, and high schools, was elected county 
executive in 1994. Thornton's and Curry's  efforts, though not always aligned, enabled 
                                                
 






the end of court-mandated, racial quota-based school assignments,327 a relief to black 
Prince Georgians frustrated with the transporting of children away from majority-
black schools near their neighborhoods to majority-black schools in other 
neighborhoods.  
 Presenting to the NAACP the board's rationale for ending busing in 1996-97, 
the school district said it was finally able to give the leaders of the organization "what 
they really wanted: good schools and equality in education."328 As County Executive 
Wayne Curry was winding down his first term in office in 1998, a federal court ended 
twenty-six years of mandatory busing, and school district leaders committed to 
returning children to neighborhood schools, constructing and refurbishing, buildings, 
and increasing academic outcomes. In 2002, with some of the plans still in 
development and black students comprising seventy-seven percent of the district's 
134,000 total enrollment, the court lifted the original desegregation order, declaring 
the school system to be in unitary status; but it continued to hold the district 
accountable for following through on the goals set in 1998.329 The order ended the 
intensive thirty-year desegregation effort, which journalist Lisa Frazier noted had 
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never succeeded as a "panacea for a quality education for African-American students 
in Prince George's County."330   
 The largely unified, community-based, black political force that had 
advocated for just and fair desegregation policies from the 1950s to the early 1970s 
was grounded in civil rights movement ideals: state-protected exercise of 
constitutional rights, as well as equal and equitable provision of public-funded 
services, including public education. In the 1990s, the county's top political 
leadership was set on building "an enclave of black prosperity," as county schools 
dealt with achievement gaps, management, and funding problems, as well as a lack of 
engagement by the "economic and political elites with the education of its 
children."331 As political scientist Valerie Johnson theorized in her study of the 
wielding political power among suburban blacks, in the now majority black Prince 
George's County, the interests of the whole group had become subordinate to the 
particular interests of a segment of the population.332 
 
 Charles James, a 1975 graduate of DuVal High and 1979 graduate of Georgia 
Institute of Technology, suggests that desegregation enabled divisions and breaks 
within black communities through a process of pushing out, dividing, and isolating: 
In segregation, the drug addict was in the neighborhood, the teacher was, the 
preacher, everybody was in there together. But once people started getting 
money and integration came, black people that had something could go live 
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wherever they wanted … and so now all those neighborhoods were just left 
with the people who couldn't get out. And their whole experience is 
completely different.333  
 
 James' theory is somewhat supported by the New York Times' 2002 depiction 
of Prince George's County's evolution as the nation's black suburban utopia. 
  







This study joins other twenty-first-century scholars in questioning how African 
Americans interpreted school desegregation during the first few decades following 
the U.S. Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education. Examining 
the meanings of school desegregation among African Americans in Prince George's 
County, Maryland, from 1954 to 1974, I have argued that individuals, families, 
communities, and organized groups actively and consistently advocated for policies 
that would ensure black children received instruction, services, and resources that 
were equal to and equitable with white children's schooling. While optimistic about 
the opportunities and access desegregation could afford their children, black families, 
communities, students, and educators also appreciated the benefits of segregated 
schooling, including the awareness that black children were physically safer within 
their own communities and that their black teachers were more empathetic of cultural 
attitudes and behaviors.  
 Blacks assessed the county's school desegregation policies as being based in 
preconceived notions of the inferiority of black schools and communities. Such 
notions imposed inequities and undue burdens upon blacks, who throughout the 
period endured the withholding of instructional resources, the closing of schools in 
their neighborhoods, longer travel distances between their homes and their schools, 
and the physical neglect of their school buildings. These inequities were grounded in 
the racial ethics of school board members, and as such, prompted blacks to proudly 
affirm their racial identity, as well as affirm the value of their communities and 




 Fought and won on Thurgood Marshall's commitment to ensuring the equal 
rights of black children and enabling a more racially integrated society, the Brown v. 
Board of Education victory was a stimulus for equality in American public education. 
The Supreme Court's eradication of the separate-but-equal statute, its declaration that 
"separate is inherently unequal," inspired black individuals and organizations, 
especially the NAACP, to launch and sustain a decades-long campaign to end racial 
separation in the nation's public schools. Their work was driven by the presumption 
that desegregation would place black children at the same starting point as white 
children in their education, and would guarantee their unobstructed access to the 
equal facilities and resources. However, despite the legal impetus of Brown and of 
Marshall's abiding belief in it, local school districts freely interpreted the ruling and 
obstructed desegregation, while the federal government interpreted the ruling as 
justification for extinguishing black schools.  
 Black communities had not waited until 1954 to pursue learning and endorse 
the idea of public education. Schools for black children operated even during slavery. 
In the succeeding decades, schools were built, black teachers were trained, and 
classes were held with funding from the government, service organizations, 
philanthropists, and their own communities. Midway through the twentieth century, 
the Brown ruling compelled them to weigh the practical, social, and cultural 
advantages of their segregated schools against the advantages and disadvantages their 
children might find in desegregated schools.  
In Prince George's, the freedom-of-choice desegregation policy demonstrated 




apply it selectively. Some black families in Prince George's readily applied to enroll 
their children in integrated schools through the policy, but a school board member 
who spoke with the Civil Rights Commission for its 1976 report on the county's 
desegregation program said freedom of choice had rendered "only token 
desegregation." However, with the nation's highest court having rendered a ruling that 
clearly reflected empathy for the educational rights of black children, black 
communities thought Brown also would compel their local school boards toward fair, 
equal, and nondiscriminatory practices, though not necessarily desegregation – and 
certainly not forced desegregation.  
A key impetus for black parents' push for desegregation in the immediate 
years after Brown was the inconvenience of their children traveling upwards of thirty 
miles round-trip daily to attend schools designated for black children only, when they 
lived closer – in some cases, within walking distance – of schools designated for 
white children only. The school district's neglect of maintenance and repair at schools 
for black children provided further motivation for black parents to push for their 
children's integration into better maintained white schools. The disregard for black 
children was insidiously demeaning. "We were getting second-hand equipment at 
Fairmont Heights, the helmets, the pads," Fred Jennings recalled. In my senior year, I 
remember we got new shoulder pads. I thought I was a pro football player! Never 
knew that the white schools, they'd get a change of equipment every year," Fred 
said.334 
 





 The U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's compulsory 
intervention into Prince George's County's school desegregation planning in the late 
1960s revealed that the government gave no more thought to the possible educational 
value of black schools than county leaders did. Policy makers at every level of 
government ignored or failed to regard the historical network of black communities 
and black schools, or to consider the educational, economic, or social consequences 
of abandoning those schools. Neither the federal government nor the school district 
demonstrated concern for the pedagogical or psychological affects on black children 
of shutting down their schools, nor of replacing most of their black teachers with 
white teachers. Black communities generally supported their schools. Faced with the 
challenge of desegregating county schools, parents, teachers, students, and black 
county residents advocated to keep them open and well resourced to preserve the 
socio-cultural value of their schools. Repeatedly presented with desegregation plans 
that disproportionately impacted their children, families, and communities, they 
called for fair and inclusive planning; equal and fair representation; and equal 
resources, facilities, and services. At the September 26, 1972, public hearing on the 
Johnson-Golato Resolution, James L. Gainey of the Model Neighborhood Action 
Board conveyed the frustration and sense of insult some blacks were feeling, but also 
affirmed their pride: "We will not sit idly by scratching our heads and shuffling our 
feet to the music of this educational larceny," Gainey said. These schools are valuable 
assets to us and must be preserved at all costs."335  
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 Within the context of black Prince Georgians' history in America, black 
schools contributed significantly. Black activism for education equality during the 
twenty years after Brown v. Board of Education was an affirmation of the pride 
blacks had in their schools and communities, as well as an insistence on equality for 
their children. Still, viewpoints on desegregation among black county residents were 
not consistent or static. Within the first decade of the Brown ruling, families acted 
independently to enroll their children in white schools: Bull Curry and Dervey Lomax 
took legal action against the school system, and Willie Thomas' parents used the 
freedom-of-choice option to apply for his transfer to a white school. However, some 
black parents placed priority on advocating for improved conditions and equal 
resources at the black schools in the neighborhoods. With petitions, letter writing, and 
testimony at board meetings, black civic associations began to lobby collectively for a 
coordinated desegregation plan throughout the county. Many black parents were 
moved to support desegregation based not only on the civil basis of the issue, but also 
on its moral rightness. Some adults' own negative experiences within de facto 
segregation and their concerns for their children's immediate safety caused them to 
view desegregation with more skepticism and anxiety than optimism. Even parents 
and teachers who supported desegregation worried that hostile attitudes within white 
communities, including among white students and white teachers, would project onto 
their children and undermine their confidence and abilities. Blacks knew 
desegregation was intended to be a civil advantage, so they went into it more hopeful 




progress into their lives and balance it with tradition, community, and their children's 
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interview subjects quoted in the thesis are listed below, along with the year they 
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